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1Abbreviations
References to Jean-François Lyotard’s texts will use the following abbreviations:
PC The Postmodern Condition (1984)
JG Just Gaming (1985)
D The Differend (1988)
2Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to explore the exclusionary implications of conceptions of
deliberative democracy that aim towards reaching consensus, and to present an alternative
conception of political deliberation that takes difference and antagonism as constitutive
of the political. I will use Jean-François Lyotard’s concept of the differend as a critical
tool for normative assessment of deliberative processes, and present Iris Marion Young’s
conception of ‘communicative democracy’ as a credible starting point for politics that
aim to do justice to group difference, understood as a structurally constituted and situated
phenomenon.
The branch of democratic theory broadly called ‘deliberative democracy’, has, for the last
few decades, been the one of the most promising candidates for a conception of
democracy that could best fulfil the ideal of government reflecting the will of the people,
resulting in the most just decisions and outcomes possible. The ideal of the free, public
deliberation of citizens as the source of legitimacy for law-making could be presented as
an alternative to theories of democratic politics that focus on the clash and aggregation of
private group interests. Iris Young describes deliberative democracy as setting as its
normative starting point the idea that the best way to conduct public affairs and to make
public decisions is by public deliberation (Young 2001, 672):
In deliberation, parties to conflict, disagreement, and decision making propose solutions to
their collective problems and offer reasons for them; they criticize one another's proposals
and reasons and are open to being criticized by others. Deliberative democracy differs from
some other attitudes and practices in democratic politics in that it exhorts participants to be
concerned not only with their own interests but to listen to and take account of the interests
of others insofar as these are compatible with justice. (Young 2001, 672).
To be realized, however, this seemingly straightforward idea requires a strong normative
focus on the rules by which this political deliberation is done. If democratic deliberation
is to be free from undue influence of inequalities in power, it needs to compensate for this
by adhering to the demands of reasonability, the plurality of the aims and opinions of the
participants, and their equality (Cohen 1997, 74 ff.). Outside relations of power should
not affect deliberation, in which the ideal should be a situation in which diverse claims
and opinions are both evaluated and transformed by reasonable discussion, and in the end,
the best argument should carry the day.
3Jürgen Habermas (1996, 21 ff.) sets the model of deliberative politics against what he
calls the ‘liberal’ and ‘republican’ paradigms of democracy. The liberal paradigm is based
on the aggregation of antagonistic private interests in the context of an arbitrating state,
and the republican paradigm on a ‘substantively integrated ethical community’ or a
community that shares a common vision of the good. The conception of deliberative
democracy sets a vision of democracy as a procedural system based on public
argumentation, discourse and bargaining that can aim towards a consensus on the
common good without making any substantive ethical presuppositions the conditions of
participation (Habermas 1996, 24). This ‘ideal procedure’ (Cohen 1997, 72) gives a
normative account of deliberative democracy that deliberative processes can be compared
with to measure their legitimacy. It is this critical normative dimension that I consider the
most important feature of any conception of deliberative democracy.
The most important of these conditions are the assumed plurality of the participants, an
orientation towards reaching a consensus, and the using of reasonable argument as the
method of deliberation (Cohen 1997, 72 ff.). These are designed to make reaching an
overreaching agreement possible despite the plurality of the aims and interests of the
participants. Deliberation transforms the interests and opinions brought into it by the force
of the better argument: in the end, the best alternative is both formulated and assented to
by the participants themselves. In this the deliberative model differs most fundamentally
from models of democracy conceptualized as a clash between different group interests.
However, the ideal deliberative procedure, despite its many virtues, and the theoretical
capability of including within itself the largest possible spectrum of reasonable opinions
present in any deliberative situation, can itself become the source of exclusion of
meaningful difference from deliberative processes. It might be that the language and
idiom used for deliberation does not lend itself to speaking about some existing social
problems. It might be that the presumption of consensus makes deliberation unwilling to
attend to divisive subjects that are then left unaddressed, due to the fear of bringing up
conflict and unbridgeable antagonism. The deliberation itself can, in real life situations,
be taken over by the strong and the powerful to serve their own interests, while still
remaining ostensibly reasonable. The norms of communication adhered to in the
deliberation can actually privilege certain culture-specific forms of communication over
others. Even if everyone was ostensibly acting in good faith and willing to bracket the
4influence of inequalities in power outside the deliberative setting, the very language used
in deliberation can be distorted by structural inequalities in power outside it. These are all
examples of what could be called, after the work of Jean-François Lyotard, a ‘differend’.
During his life, Jean-François Lyotard’s thought made a broad arc from active
participation in the radical socialist movement Socialisme ou barbarie and agitation
towards socialist revolution in Algeria in the 1950s, to a profound disillusionment with
revolutionary leftist politics and a lasting cynical scepticism towards all positive political
projects. After a phase in the 1970s in which he wrote about ‘libidinal economy’ that tried
to conceptualise exchanges and movements of power in society in terms of intensities of
desire, he became one of the main articulators of the rising ‘postmodernism’. Towards
the end of the 1970s he began to write on politics from the standpoint of a deep suspicion
towards ‘grand narratives’ like those of modernity, Enlightenment and progressive,
consensus-oriented democratic politics, targeting especially Jürgen Habermas, the main
proponent of a dialogical revision of Kantian ethics that defends Enlightenment values
and reaching for political consensus. (See Williams 1998, Chapter 1 & PC, 60 ff.)
The Differend (1988) is Lyotard’s definitive political work. It is a collection of more or
less connected aphorisms that often contradict each other, the main theme of the work,
reflected in its form, being the uncertain relationship between reality and language and
how the former reveals and occludes itself in the latter. The problem has deep political
implications, as politics, self-evidently, relies on language and communication for its
conduct to be possible.
Lyotard’s gives a number of explications of the differend. However, he provides no
unequivocal definition. The most useful to the purposes of this introduction is the one
given in the context of litigation:
A case of differend between two parties takes place where the ‘regulation’ of the conflict
that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by
the other is not signified in that idiom. (D, §12)
Seyla Benhabib, while criticizing Lyotard for conceptual vagueness, gives the following
definition: what the differend means ranges from ‘radical untranslatability in language to
the sense of unfairness or injustice that may be experienced when the language of the
victor is invoked to describe the wounds of the vanquished’ (Benhabib 2002, 30). It is
5this latter definition that, I believe, deserves attention in the context of political theory.
The differend can be understood as the problem of being unable to communicate a
suffered injustice because the shared contextual framework lacks the means for its
articulation. This has implications for conceptions of deliberative democracy that take the
shared contextual framework as a given: the possibility of consensus hinges on the
possibility of mutual understanding, and this hinges on the possibility of being capable to
articulate all suffered injustices in an idiom that everyone is capable of understanding and
willing to attend to.
Claiming that the ‘phrases’ by which we communicate, do politics, are always in dispute,
Lyotard takes a negative view on all philosophical projects of politics, especially ones
aiming to lay ground rules for a pluralistic, ‘reformist’, consensus-oriented democracy.
Consensus is always false, as it is always promoted in and by language games which can
never be legitimated (PC, 60), exhaustively grasp the reality talked about, ‘hold it all in’,
and truly do justice to the pluralism and difference inherent in every society. Reaching
consensus, ‘resolving all litigations’ (D, §263), would not mean the achieving of a
peaceful and legitimate accord between parties, but the institution of a tyrannical regime
of Truth that extinguishes the possibility of all deliberation by eliminating altogether the
space for difference and dispute (D, §253). Reaching consensus would the institution of
a total differend—fortunately the uncertain nature of language makes it impossible, as it
can always be questioned: ‘The differend is reborn from the very resolution of supposed
litigations.’ (D, §263.) However, Lyotard, as noted, refuses to build anything to replace
the edifice of politics he tears down by insisting on the recurrence of the differend, of the
incapability of language to clamp down on the uncertain occurrence:
But the occurrence doesn’t make a story, does it?-Indeed, it’s not a sign. But it  is  to be
judged, all the way through to its incomparability. You can’t make a political ‘program’
with it, but you can bear witness to it. (D, §264, emphasis mine.)
Lyotard is not the only thinker to have rejected the notion of consensus as the end-point
of politics, but his argument is especially interesting because of its linguistic dimension.
I argue that while Lyotard’s negativity and desire to remain outside the field of political
theory leaves precious little to build on, the differend can be eminently useful as concept
for normative evaluation of politics, as a way to investigate possible sources of silencing
and exclusion in positive projects of political theory. I hold that the basic tenets of
6deliberative democracy can be held, even if we let go of the orientation towards consensus
with is exclusionary implications.
The aim of this thesis is to examine what a conception of deliberative democracy sensitive
to the existence of differends would look like. What would have to be changed to make
it possible to create a conception of deliberative democracy that would actively promote
seeking out differends and solving, or ‘bearing witness’, to them?
I argue that there already exists a version of deliberative democracy that can give a
number of answers to the question thus put. Iris Marion Young proposes an amendment
to the deliberative model that she calls ‘communicative democracy’ (See Young 1996 &
Young 2000, 52–77). I argue that this conception provides a good starting point for
relating the concept of the differend to political communication, as it underlines, and
presents solutions to, many of the problems that could be said to produce differends in
consensus-oriented deliberative politics.
Young argues that deliberative democracy is a good blueprint for a critical understanding
of democratic politics. However, it has its limitations: for example, the norms of
deliberation are assumed to be culturally neutral and they make undue assumptions about
the unity of the participants and the shared assumptions that are at the background of
deliberation (Young 1996, 122–125). The deliberative model, despite its professed
openness to plurality, carries with it a number of exclusionary implications that result in
the formation of differends.
Young argues that democratic processes should aim towards greater inclusion as a matter
of justice (Young 2000, 53). Deliberative democracy, with its normative commitment to
equality between its participants, demands that decisions should include the polity they
concern as fully as possible, in their formulation (Young 2000, 26 ff.). To this end she
claims that formal inclusion in deliberation is not enough: often the very norms of
communication exclude some voices from deliberation (Young 1996, 123).
I contend that the thought of Young is especially relevant here, because she is one of the
few writers on deliberative politics who have actually written—albeit shortly—about
deliberative theory as a possible way to solve differends. Differends, according to Young,
are caused and upheld by the silencing and exclusion of some perspectives from the realm
of political communication due to the imbalances of power in the structural framework
7of society that condition the communicative processes themselves (Young 2000, 37, 72).
She aims to solve the problem through a focus on more inclusive communicative
practices, ones that attend to the structurally constituted plurality present in any society.
These practices should be able bring to deliberative discourse hitherto silenced reflection
on socio-economic structures and the situated social perspectives of those who experience
these structures as ‘objective, given and constraining’ (Young 2011, 54). One important
thread of her project is the abandoning of consensus and unity as the starting point, or a
goal, for deliberative politics.
What is needed, then, is a concept of deliberative democracy that is ready to deal with
discord and difference and understands democracy being both a struggle between groups
that are differently situated to each other in relations of privilege and disadvantage, and
the best method to transcend these differences and find a way to reach understanding over
them. The notion of ‘communication’ is, according to Young, preferable to that of
deliberation, because it reflects this distance and difference between the participants, their
willingness to reach over them to reach understanding, and ‘better shows a connection
between the ideal of democracy and social justice’ (Young 1993, 125, 128).
The both ideal conception of political deliberation and real-life deliberative situations can
contain conditions of both external and internal exclusion (Young 2000, 53 ff.) that make
it impossible for certain political actors to take part or make their voice heard in politics:
these are the conditions for the formation of differends. Overcoming the differend,
enabling understanding over difference, is impossible without a way to refer to a common
reality, establishing a common referent. Iris Marion Young’s account of the social model
of groups gives a sociological account of groups, a ‘concrete’ and objective group
ontology that all sides of the deliberation will be forced to accept. This ontology is a way
to ensure that all narratives told refer to something, to social structures that are accepted
as a social reality. This is what Young calls ‘social knowledge’, and it is what enables
‘enlarged thought’, or seeing one’s own view on society as a perspective among others,
and not as universal.
The differend can be said to be caused by the inability of ‘conventional’ models of
deliberative democracy to include different group perspectives within deliberation,
resulting in injustice that results from the ideal of deliberative democracy itself: the
8inability to speak, despite formal inclusion to the deliberation. I believe that an
understanding of the communicating subjects as existing and inhabiting a position in a
‘web’ of structured social relations is required to make way for their greater inclusion.
Such understanding also leads to casting irreconcilable antagonism between differently
situated groups as the foundation of democratic politics.
In Chapter 1 I will give an overview of the concept of the differend. In Lyotard’s thought
the differend is connected with the concept of justice, and thus it is necessary to first give
a short account of what Lyotard means when he writes about justice as a kind of language
game. Lyotard’s theory of language games owes much to the thought of Wittgenstein,
and it underlies much of his political thought, as does his reading of Kant’s aesthetics.
After this I will try to untangle the various interweaving strands of thought that lead
Lyotard to present the differend as a problem of political nature through the analogy of
litigation. After this I will show how the concept of the differend is directly relevant to
my inquiry on the shortcomings of deliberative democracy, by focusing on Lyotard’s
critique of deliberative democratic theory. I suggest that ironically, far from being a fatal
blow to conceptions of deliberative democracy, Lyotard’s thought can be used as a
corrective to make deliberative democracy a better normative ideal for politics that aim
towards inclusion and justice.
In Chapter 2 I describe what I dub in the context of this thesis the ‘standard model’ of
deliberative democracy. I chose Joshua Cohen’s (1997) conception of deliberative
democracy as ‘ideal procedure’ as my blueprint, as its clarity, conciseness and
compatibility with most conceptions of deliberative democracy, including the discursive
ethics of Jürgen Habermas, make it the best candidate. Cohen’s conception contains all
the essential normative conditions that deliberative democracy must fulfil: freedom,
equality between participants, reasonability, and orientation towards a rationally
motivated consensus (Cohen 1997, 72 ff.). I will then investigate the possibility of
criticizing this ideal procedure from the standpoint of non-ideal conditions. I will argue
alongside Iris Marion Young that the ideal procedure requires justice to already to obtain
in order to result in just outcomes. In unjust, non-ideal conditions the ideal procedure will
end up reinforcing existing injustices, resulting in differends.
9In order to be able to grapple with differends in a meaningful way, deliberative political
theory must be made more responsive to real-life conditions of injustice, as well as the
many forms of difference that exist in a modern democratic society. The communicative
proposal by Iris Marion Young is a way to amend the conception of deliberative
democracy in order to make it capable of grappling with difference. I begin Chapter 3 by
first exploring the implications of setting the conception of deliberative democracy in the
context of ‘adversarial’ politics, as opposed to the standard model’s orientation towards
consensus. I use the term ‘adversarial politics’ to denote a conception of politics that
abandons consensus and the common good as the goals of democracy. I use Chantal
Mouffe’s work on agonistic politics to gain insights on politics that, instead of the
possibility of reaching consensus and focusing on the common good, assume difference,
antagonism and the irreducibility of the diverse ends of the members of any polity as the
starting point of differend-sensitive politics.
Chantal Mouffe argues that the ideal of consensus both extinguishes the drive for seeking
genuine alternatives to the current political status quo, and, more dangerously, precludes
genuine disagreement from entering the political arena, where it could be addressed by
democratic and peaceful means (Mouffe 2005b, 3). Democratic politics are, according to
Mouffe, better conceptualized as the second member of a ‘dualistic’ ontological scheme
of politics. A polity should be understood as divided in to the ‘ontological’ level of
antagonistic social relations, and the ‘ontic’ level of politics that should aim to reflect on
and change these relations (Mouffe 2005b, 9). This dualist ontology will form the basis
of my attempt to formulate a differend-sensitive conception of communicative
democracy.
In chapters 3.2 and 3.3 I aim to give an ontology of the social level as constituted by
structural relations. To meaningfully grapple with the differend as a problem of including
difference, a politically salient way to speak about group difference is needed. I first
investigate and reject culture-based models of social groups as inconsistent and
insufficient for my purposes, and then adopt a structural conception of groups given by
Iris Marion Young. I suggest with Young that a politically salient way to model group
difference would be to understand members of the polity as finding themselves ‘thrown’
into social positions that are in structural relations of privilege and disadvantage to each
other. People in similar social positions have a similar shared, situated perspective into
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society. The problem of the differend could then be understood to arise when some
perspectives are left out from politics and cast into silence. The ‘ontic’ level of
deliberative politics should aim to include the widest possible amount of different social
perspectives for differends to be witnessed and solved.
It becomes apparent that we are not only dealing with the nature of deliberative
communication, we are also recasting who is communicating in the first place. In the
suggested conception of communicative democracy the assumed participant in
deliberation becomes less an ideal, ‘generalized’ one, taking part in an ideal conversation.
Instead we recast the subject as a ‘concrete’ one, complete with a personal history and
affiliations of her own, acting within a web of social and economic relations. (See
Benhabib 1985, 94). Deliberative democracy should aim to reflect the concrete and
irreducible plurality of its participants, and, as Young exhorts take up this difference as a
resource, not as a hindrance (Young 1996, 126).
I suggest that cultural belonging or identity is not enough to require a political distinction
between groups to be made. What is required is an ontology of groups that is not based
on substantial identity, but on an account of structural social relations. I present this idea
of social groups as an integral part of the account of communicative democracy given in
this thesis, and a requirement for its functioning. A way to speak about social structures
and the ways they influence deliberative processes and their participants needs to be
established to really come to grips with differends, and a model of social groups and
situated perspectives gives a politically salient account of these structures.
In chapter 3.4 I present Young’s own ‘amendment’ of the deliberative model she calls
‘communicative’ democracy as a good basis for a conception of democratic politics that
can be combined with the above ontological model of a democratic society. Young aims
to make way for culturally specific modes of communication that the ideal standard model
of deliberation excludes from the political arena. Using the general scheme given by
Young and combining it with theoretical insights from Susan Bickford, Seyla Benhabib,
James Bohman and others, I put the communicative proposal forward as an amended
theory of deliberative democracy that adds new modes of communication to deliberation
besides argument from shared premises: greeting, rhetoric and narrative. These modes of
communication are not meant to supplant reasonable argumentation, but to transform the
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concept of reasonability underlying deliberative democracy into a more inclusive one. I
argue that different forms of expression need to be included into democracy as an attempt
to reveal differends, to come to grips with difference and to understand difference as a
resource for bringing about a more just polity, not a hindrance for democracy.
In chapter 3.5 I review recent arguments made by Paul Healy that call for a further,
dialogical appropriation of the communicative model as put forward by Young. Healy
desires to replace the notion of deliberation with that of a hermeneutical, transformative
dialogical encounter. Healy claims that the deliberative framework makes a truly
transformative encounter with difference impossible: the solution should be a move to a
‘transformative dialogue’ that would enable a new, truly edifying relation to difference
and a more democratic public sphere.
I end this thesis in chapter 4 by focusing on a single essay by Young titled ‘Activist
Challenges to Deliberative Democracy’ (2001b). It is possible that even the most
inclusive communicative democracy possible might have limits as to its capacity for
bringing about justice and resolving differends. The virtues of democratic political
activism might highlight different sides of the democratic push for a more just polity.
The differend seems to be a problem, an empty space, right in the middle of what we
could describe as a number of ‘axes’ of deliberative politics. It seems to touch upon the
problems of justice, legitimation, difference and consensus; what deliberative
communication should be like, and the form and scope of the communicative rationality
and reasonableness that these processes attempt to lay claim to. The investigation of these
axes reveals a myriad of different ways that deliberative processes can be said to produce
and uphold differends. However, it also suggests numerous possibilities of formulating
ways to solve them.
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1. The Differend
In this chapter I will first give an introduction on the problem of what Jean-François
Lyotard calls the differend. I will do this by beginning from the problem of justice as it
relates to Lyotard’s theory of language games and politics. After this I will show that
despite the inherent negativity of Lyotard’s project, the concept of the differend is useful
as a critical tool for assessing positive theories of democratic politics. The concept of the
differend will be the key normative tool to the critique of consensus-oriented conceptions
of deliberative democracy that follows in subsequent chapters. I use James Williams’
insightful commentaries as an aid to understanding Lyotard’s thought.
Lyotard’s outlook on politics is related to two recurring themes in his work: first, Algeria,
more precisely, the colonial rule of Algeria by France and the later Algerian war for
independence; second: Auschwitz. Young Lyotard worked as a teacher in Algeria in the
1950s, and saw at first hand the impact of the colonial rule. The difference between the
working-class Algerians and the French colonial power was all-encompassing, effected
on all levels from the cultural to the economic, and in the end led to the violent uprising
against the French colonial power. Later he became intimately involved in the radical
socialist group Socialisme ou barbarie, and agitated for a working-class revolution in
Algeria and France. The failure of the Leftist revolution in Algeria and the decades of
authoritarian rule that followed had the effect of making him cynical about the possibility
of effecting meaningful change through the usual channels of party politics, as they could
always be co-opted and dominated by capitalist economics (Williams 2000, 19).
Auschwitz, on the other hand, is a much more horrible glimpse of the abyss of the
differend: the camp was an event so large, so terrible, that it is impossible to fit it into
language in its totality. In Auschwitz all traces of pre-war morality and the sense of a
collective humanity as a political subject disappeared: the ‘we’ vanished in Auschwitz
(D, §155 ff.) It is this vanishing of ways of legitimating political collectivity that drives
Lyotard to cynicism and abandoning all positive projects of theorizing politics, and
towards the negation of all attempts at legitimating politics ‘from the outside’ that finally
finds its expression in the concept of the differend.
This cynicism lead him first, in his writings on libidinal economy, to theorize political
resistance to economic forces through an ‘active passivity’ to the possibility of
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unexpected events in the working of capitalism (Williams 2000, 4). In his later work,
from the late 1970’s onwards, he sets aside the concept of the libidinal and begins a
thorough critique of the possibility of any politics that recognizes a ‘we’, a community
that could reach consensus within itself about what it ought to be and do (D, §210-211).
Reality is always filled with irreconcilable differences that cannot be completely
represented in language: ‘Reality entails the differend.’ (D, §92).
All communication contains differends because all communication is coming to grips
with the problem of expressing the inexpressible, of dealing with difference, of trying
(and failing) to find a way to communicate over it. There can be no final understanding
over difference, over different ‘genres of discourse’. There can be no master discourse, a
metanarrative that could, in a way, ‘hold it all in’ and by referral to which disputes over
meaning could be adjudicated (Williams 1998, 34). This thesis of radical untranslatability
between language games and the perceived failure of ‘grand narratives’ were, of course,
in the centre of the great debate on postmodernity that Lyotard himself worked to ignite
in the late 1970’s and which seemed, for a part, revolve around the opposition of positive
political theorists like Habermas against Lyotard’s postmodernism, of the continuation of
the project of the Enlightenment towards universal emancipation, opposed with a
restaking of spheres of difference, a return to multiple separate communities of meaning.
A way to gain a perspective on the differend could be seeing it as the problem of language
itself coming in the way of voicing actually experienced injustice out loud. It pertains to
the way we speak about justice: to be the victim of a differend is to suffer an injustice. To
bring a differend into light is to invite us to solve it, to turn attention to injustice and to
attempt to bring justice about. Lyotard seems quite positive that we are, in fact, often
unable to do otherwise: language itself presents the call to end differends, to do justice,
and we, hopelessly trapped inside language, might just have to answer. It is because of
this that we need to first look at how Lyotard treats justice.
1.1 Justice as a Language Game
Drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein, Lyotard’s Just Gaming (1985) discusses making
judgments of justice as a kind of language game. The language game of justice should be
seen as different from other language games, such as, for example, the language game of
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truth and knowledge, epistemology, or the telling of stories about ourselves and the
others, the game of narratives (JG, 24).
Lyotard draws explicit boundaries between different language games1. Lyotard claims
that Western politics are marred by the mixing of the language game of political with the
theoretical. By this he means that since the days of Plato, philosophers have been trying
to form theoretical models of society that could be used as models for creating real-life
political systems (JG, 25). This domination of political and ethical life by ideal theories
that lay claim to knowledge, episteme, of political and ethical matters, is an oppressive
relation that results from a forced mixing of two different language games (JG, 53). This
mixing has been the source of a vast history of real-life political oppression, as
philosophers and intellectuals have created political decrees that have their base in a
supposedly infallible political knowledge that social reality is then made to conform with
(JG, 24).2
Lyotard claims that mixing of different language games is dangerous, and gives the
chance for one language game to dominate over the others (JG, 53). Different language
games play by different rules, and mixing means imposing rules on a language game from
the outside. In the case of politics it is important to separate from each other the language
game of the prescriptive, of requests, commands, which is inextricably bound with
justice, and the game of the denotative, which principally deals with the distinction of
true/false (PC, 46). When talking about justice we should not start from a theoretical
model or a ‘narrative’ of a just society, but the statements of prescription, as separate
from epistemological statements of truth or falsity. Justice is thus something that refuses
to be put into theoretical statements that could be given an epistemological value of true
or false.
1 The  terminology  in Just Gaming is used vaguely. The term ‘language game’ sometimes seems
interchangeable with the concept of a ‘genre of discourse’. In The Differend (1988) Lyotard  builds on the
work done in Just Gaming and uses term ‘phrase regimen’ much like ‘language game’  is used here. See D
§39, §40, §41.
2 Lyotard’s thought resembles here the model of politics put forward by Jacques Rancière in Disagreement:
Politics and Philosophy (1999). Rancière argues that ‘politics’ is always external to political philosophy,
which since the days of Plato has attempted to eliminate politics altogether by replacing it with a regime of
political theory. Politics should be understood as a rupture in, and a reorganization of, the everyday
managing of the affairs of the society, which Rancière calls the police to separate it from politics. See
Rancière (1999), pp. 28–30.
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Prescriptive statements cannot, according to Lyotard, be grounded on theoretical
statements. Prescriptive statements take the form of requests that cannot be obtained
logically from denotative statements (JG, 25). This, I believe, is a way of presenting the
Humean maxim of ‘no ought from is’. To claim a theoretical base for judgements of
justice is to attempt to dominate politics from outside them, to subject the game of the
prescriptive to rules alien to it.
How is this related to any conception of deliberative democracy? While the point being
made here is abstract, from it follows that politics, in order to be just, must be separated
from any theoretical outside influences. This means that Lyotard’s politics are also hostile
to any attempt to mediation through seeking, for example, a consensus on issues through
deliberative means (Williams 1998, 102). Williams argues that Lyotard attempts to
describe the ‘postmodern condition’ of politics as the absence of any possibility of
legitimation: trying to ground judgments of justice on other language games or mediation
between them is impossible, because the laws of the game of justice are incommensurable
with other language games (2000, 108). The judgment of justice and the theoretical
statement, as belonging to different language games, are in respect to each other in a
differend: to reconcile them would be to do injustice to either one or both (Williams 1998,
103). This is what is meant by saying that to mix the language game of politics with other
language games is to do an injustice.
This also means that all the usual narratives of such legitimation are suspect. As even
scientific study, the denotative language game par excellence, can no longer rely on the
‘grand narratives’ of emancipation of humanity or the dialectic of Spirit (PC, 60) to supply
it with the rules of its own conduct, politics as aiming towards justice need to be separated
from them, too. One is still forced to make judgments of justice, but to let them be guided
by a theoretical Idea is to let in the possibility of that Idea taking over political life – that
is to say, to open the door to, for example, the Terror of the French Revolution (JG, 92).
Instead Lyotard sketches out a model of justice as something of an Aristotelian tekhnè,
an art instead of knowledge (JG, 28)3. We are always caught up in a situation, in a
historical narrative. Our judgements cannot be guided by truth, because we cannot see
3 See Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chapter 1. Lyotard seems to equivocate here between justice as a
normative ideal and justice, or being just, as a stable character trait acquired through interaction with people.
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our situation from the outside. There is no place from which one could ‘photograph the
whole thing’ (JG, 43). Instead, politics seems to be best formed around ‘ceaseless
negotiations and ruses’ (JG, 43), to listening to things asked of us and doing our best to
become good at being just, if such thing is possible:
And so, when the question of what justice consists in is raised, the answer is: “It remains
to be seen in each case,” and always in humor, but also in worry, because one is never
certain that one has been just, or that one can ever be just. And that is due to this specific
language game that includes prescription and obligation, whereas one can be certain of
having been true. (JG, 99.)
Lyotard thus rejects the possibility of making absolute judgements of justice. Instead he
seems more concerned with allowing no-one to master the language game of prescription;
that the field of justice is always open for everyone to play and negotiate in. It seems as
though justice also presents us with a prescriptive, a demand to action whenever we see
or feel injustice: we just have to answer this demand.
As language games go, the game of justice is thus different because of its focus on
listening:
For us, a language is first and foremost someone talking. But there are language games in
which the important thing is to listen, in which the rule deals with audition. Such a game
is the game of the just. And in this game, one speaks only inasmuch one listens, that is, one
speaks as a listener, and not as an author. (JG, 71–72.)
This focus on listening and listeners indicates an important point Lyotard is trying to
make:  doing justice is not speaking justice, that is, trying to make denotative statements
about what is just, or anyone being an author of statements about justice. To do so would
be to mix language games, to try to dominate justice from outside it. Still, it would seem
we need to be able to make judgments of some sort: to claim otherwise would also leave
one theoretically without a leg to stand on when claiming the impossibility of judgments
of justice in the first place. James Williams reads Lyotard as seeking for a way of
‘minimal judging’, judging as ‘a sensitivity and a response to differences without a resort
to a pre-set framework for establishing those differences’ (Williams 2000, 98).
This intuition of injustice seems to be intricately bound with the feeling of a wrong, an
amorphous suspicion of there being an injustice that cannot be articulated, brought to
language. According to Williams, the feeling of injustice Lyotard is concerned with is
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always a negative one, a feeling of limits (Williams 1998, 116). Lyotard’s suspicion
against all theoretical statements about justice or injustice leads him to denounce all
possibility of philosophically articulating a roadmap to what justice is, or could be, instead
underlining a sensitivity to a feeling of injustice that isn’t based on theory and cognitive
utterances.
According to Williams Lyotard at this point, simply by desiring to judge, finds himself
within a Kantian framework (Williams 2000, 101). The idea of making judgments of
justice on basis of a feeling lends itself readily to comparison with aesthetic judgments:
the feeling that Lyotard is looking for is the feeling of sublime, which, in the Kantian
scheme of senses and faculties ties together the aesthetic and political senses (Williams
2000, 103). Lyotard later engages Kant directly on this point by doing a close reading of
Kant’s aesthetic critique (D, Kant Notices 1–4). For our purposes it is enough to say that
Lyotard claims that judgments of justice should be understood as analogous to aesthetic
judgments, and as such, outside any theoretical schema of politics.
In The Differend Lyotard defines the sublime as the feeling of imagination having the
need to supply a ‘direct, sensible representation for an Idea of reason’, and failing (D,
Kant Notice 4. §4.) This causes a mixed feeling of expectation and frustration (Williams
2000, 23) when historical events fail to do justice to ideas of reason, such as, for example,
‘human progress’, ‘justice’, or ‘French Revolution’. This is the feeling that refuses
articulation, and gives a negative content to the concept of the differend.
Lyotard actively refuses Kant’s unity of the theoretical and practical faculties and the
appeal towards human community and a theoretical account of justice within it that these
entail (D, Kant Notice 4, §5–6). Instead the split is complete, and we are left with a mere
negative framework for telling how reality isn’t. Lyotard refuses to lapse to complete
nihilism, however. Through a careful analysis of language games, he claims to be able to
show that injustice is related to domination of one language game by another. Injustice,
then, is borne out of ‘encounters between phrases of heterogenous regimen’ (D, §39), out
of attempts to dominate the game of the prescriptive from outside it.
1.2 The Concept of the Differend
In Just Gaming Lyotard presented a model of injustice as domination of one language
game by another. In The Differend he develops this thought further, showing how this
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idea of language games as separate can be extended into a negative critique of progressive
politics in general. This is done by presenting all such politics as marred and delegitimized
by a differend, a clash between incommensurable ‘genres of discourse’. By doing this
Lyotard seems to equivocate between several different cases and levels of the differend.
Before settling on a description that suits my own end of showing how the differend is a
good critical tool for assessing deliberative processes, I will show how Lyotard builds on
the case of incommensurable language games.
To Lyotard the Holocaust is the definitive case of a differend, a historical event, tragedy
and injustice of such scope that it might be impossible to fit it into any language. The
Differend begins with this thought experiment:
1. You are informed that human beings endowed with language were placed in a situation
such that none of them is now able to tell about it. Most of them disappeared then, and the
survivors rarely speak about it. When they do speak about it, their testimony bears only
upon a minute part of this situation. How can you know that the situation itself existed?
That it is not the fruit of your informant's imagination? Either the situation did not exist as
such. Or else it did exist, in which case your informant's testimony is false, either because
he or she should have disappeared, or else because he or she should remain silent, or else
because, if he or she does speak, he or she can bear witness only to the particular experience
he had, it remaining to be established whether this experience was a component of the
situation in question. (D, §1.)
Lyotard then starts unravelling this thought by presenting the case of the Franco-British
academic and Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson. Faurisson became notorious in France
in the 1980’s for his avowed denial of the existence of Nazi gas chambers in extermination
camps such as Auschwitz. Lyotard presents his argument as follows: In order to
conclusively establish the existence of gas chambers, there has to be someone, who has,
with his own eyes, really seen a gas chamber in operation. Because Faurisson has not been
able to find such a person despite his tireless searching, Nazi gas chambers must be a
myth (D, §2). Lyotard points out that what is in question is not the existence of gas
chambers per se, but the fact that no-one can provide conclusive proof that there ever
were any (D, §5).
Lyotard immediately notes the dark irony of Faurisson’s logic. When identifying a room
as a gas chamber, the only acceptable eyewitness would be a victim of said gas chamber.
It is understandable that there is no-one able to speak from such a position, on account of
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all the victims of the Nazi gas chambers being dead. There are, therefore, no gas
chambers, and anyone trying to establish their existence is, by definition, unable to do so
(D, §2).
This is an example of a differend. It becomes impossible to establish the reality of there
being such a thing as a gas chamber: the only reliable witnesses that could give a
testimony of their operation from the view point of the victims are dead. The conditions
for admissible proof of a crime are set up in a way that makes presenting the proof
impossible. (D, §6.)
Lyotard likens this to the ruling ideology of the Ibanskian state in Alexander Zinoviev’s
Swiftian satire on Soviet Communism, The Yawning Heights (1979): there is no reality
other than the official one, because the only valid procedures of establishing reality are
the ones controlled by the State. Anyone not agreeing with these procedures can be safely
declared insane or a criminal, and his testimony is not merely a lie, but lacks reality
altogether. (Zinoviev 1979, 600.)
Lyotard explicates the concept of the differend through the analogue of a case of litigation
in a court of law. In litigation, a plaintiff is suing for reparations for a damage done to
him or her by the accused. His claims are acknowledged and adjudicated by the judge,
and the outcome is, in principle, accepted by both sides as just (D, §9). The reality of the
damage done is not in question, and what is left is merely negotiating about the just
solution to the dispute.
The differend, then, is a situation in which a person or a group becomes not only a sufferer
of damages, but a victim of a wrong. The plaintiff becomes a victim suffering of a wrong
when they are at loss of the means to prove the damage done to them (D, §7), of
establishing the reality of the injustice done. While a plaintiff can present his or her case
against the accused and seek redress, a victim lacks the means to bring his or her case
forward, especially if ‘the author of the damages turns out directly or indirectly to be
one’s judge’ (D, §9). Young explicates this point as meaning that when the shared
framework of meanings behind communication is insufficient for articulating an injustice,
its sufferer is doomed to silence (Young 2000, 37).
Differends are, despite being caused by seeming incommensurability between the
available language games and reality, solveable. To show this, Lyotard turns to analysis
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of language to show how differends come about. To do this makes use of the concepts of
‘phrase’ and ‘phrase regimen’. The following are examples of phrase regimens:
descriptive, cognitive, prescriptive, evaluative, interrogative. These seem to correspond
to different types modes of speech that can, nevertheless, act simultaneously within a
single sentence. A phrase regimen is the rules for constituting a phrase. (D, xii.)
Everything said is a positive phrase. What is important to note that something not said,
left silent, is still a phrase: silences make for negative phrases, as something that is felt is
left unsaid. ‘The silence of the survivors does not necessarily testify in favour of the non-
existence of gas chambers’, Lyotard notes (D, §27). Auschwitz was an extermination
camp not just because people were exterminated there; the camp also managed, before its
downfall, to exterminate most documented proof of its operation, leaving behind it a
silence, an immense ‘wrong’ (D, §96).
Every phrase is a picture that represents a universe of four instances:
1. That, what it is about, or what is the case. (The referent.)
2. That, what is signified about it. (The signified, or der Sinn.)
3. Who is speaking. (The addresser.)
4. Who is spoken to (The addressee.)
A silent phrase is negative phrase: it can be a negation of all of these, or just one of the
instances. (D, §25.) A silent phrase can testify to the existence of a differend; the way
forward is not to try to explain the silence away through ‘judgments based on specific
accounts of reality and on the application of agreed norms’, but to bear witness to it
through creative acts (Williams 1998, 121).4
Every phrase represents a universe, creating a picture of something outside language. To
Lyotard the existence of politics is predicated on there being an event that can never be
completely represented, and is thus always at dispute (D, Kant Notice 4, §3). I understand
this to mean that to represent the world completely would be to end politics. Holocaust is
4 According to Williams, Lyotard uses the silence engendered by the Holocaust as a way to reject the
totalitarizing implications of Hegelian philosophy, in which an irresolvable contradiction always engenders
a Resultat, a result, if only by making the conflict an edifying basis for future judgments. Williams reads
Lyotard as saying that the Holocaust can serve no such purpose, as the silence it leaves cannot be put into
a cognitive context. See Williams 1998, 119 ff.
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one such event, one of such immense magnitude and horror that it, in a very real way,
escapes all description, always leaving language incapable of ‘taking it all in’. The silence
of Auschwitz cannot be put into words, it cannot be understood or revenged (Williams
1998, 121).
The events demand our immediate reaction: this the call to ‘linking’ to an event (Williams
1998, 34). All phrases aim either to represent an event, linking to it, while demanding that
other phrases link to them, or to link to another phrase. I understand this as saying that
because language itself is incapable of representing the world completely, politics will
happen: the phrases themselves are in dispute, as incomplete descriptions of an event that
escapes being completely described.
However, we do have accepted ways of speaking about things, and Lyotard calls these
‘genres of discourse’. Genres of discourse are sets of rules for linking phrases together.
Every phrase calls for a new phrase to become about and to link to it. (D, xii.) Linking of
phrases to new phrases is necessary, and usually done according to an existing genre of
discourse. However, while necessary, how the linking is done is actually contingent (D,
§136). I understand this as saying that while we are used to speaking about matters in
certain ways, we can invent new ways of speaking, new idioms, which bring to light new
sides of the world we live in. At the same time we can never be sure that we have said
everything that there is to be said, to ‘have the last word’, there will always be disputes
about what has been said, about what exists; there will always be politics.
When understood this way, I suggest that existing genres of discourse are ingrained to the
structure of our shared reality as the commonly accepted ways of speaking about that
reality, and thus quite resilient to change. The work of solving differends is then the work
of disputing the validity of the existing genre of discourse, and either demanding for a
change in it, or for its abolishment and institution of a new one.
Differends arise when a phrase regimen rules out certain ways of saying out loud
something that needs to be said, leaving only silence (D, §40.) As Lyotard puts it, ‘In the
differend, something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being
able to be put into phrases right away.’ (D, §23.) Lyotard notes that ‘the animal is a
paradigm of the victim’ (D, §37): unable to phrase its pain and discomfort into an idiom
22
we could understand, it is entirely at the mercy of its oppressors, us. The animal lacks the
means of establishing the reality of its damages, as it cannot bring them to language.
Andrew Schaap (2009) makes use of Lyotard’s concepts in characterizing the political
situation of Australian aborigines, whose claims to land, sovereignty and political
representation have categorically been dismissed by Australian courts. He uses the
scheme of a phrase universe to present their legal situation (Schaap 2009, 215): first, there
is no legally recognized history of colonization of aborigine lands in Australia (denying
the referent). Even if there were, Australian law could not recognize such claims (denying
the signified). The people making the claim are not authorized to do so in eyes of the law:
there law recognizes only Australian citizens, there is no such thing as an ‘aborigine
nation’ (denying the addresser). And even if colonization of Australia did take place, and
there was an aborigine nation, the matter would be too large for ordinary courts to rule on
(denying the addressee).
This means that however the aborigines present their case, the establishment refuses to
recognize their claims as intelligible. The aborigines are unable to speak: their legal
situation completely precludes the mere possibility them being able to testify, to present
their claims, to establish the reality of the wrong they are the victims of.
In everyday political life, differends can be said to exist wherever there is an injustice that
can’t be voiced in the ruling idiom, the ruling genre of discourse. Genres of discourse
prescribe certain ways of linking forward from phrases: the aborigines are left in a bind,
because the legal genre of discourse seems to offer no ways of linking to phrases that
could present the felt wrong of being deprived of land and rights. As Lyotard puts it: ‘The
differend is this inability to prove. The one who lodges a complaint is heard, but the one
who is a victim, and who perhaps is the same one, is reduced to silence.’ (D, §13.)
The legal metaphor Lyotard offers for the differend underlines its political urgency: it is
in politics as making judgments that differends cause most damage and suffering.
However, another kind of differend looms large over the whole project. This could be
called, as Williams (1998, 104) does, the differend ‘in general’ as opposed to ‘differends’
in the plural. The differend in general refers to the problem of ‘representing the
unrepresentable’ (Williams 1998, 84), of the possibility of there being events so large that
they cannot be fit into language, into representations. Because of the limited scope of this
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essay, I leave the treatment of this more general thesis aside; it takes Lyotard into the
terrain of the aesthetic and avant-garde art as trying to find expressions for the feeling of
the sublime. Instead I focus on differends in the plural, and the consequences that
examining the mechanisms of their formation have for assessment of conceptions of
deliberative democracy.
At first, Lyotard seems optimistic: differends in the plural can be solved. To do this, the
established truth, the established genre of discourse and phrase regimens must be attacked
by revealing their contingency, revealing new ways of linking. The universe presented by
a phrase, with its four instances, is prone to attack from all these four directions. A
negative phrase is questioned by attacking the negations in reverse order, opening up new
ways of saying things left unsaid. By ‘establishing the reality of the referent’ (D, §28),
inventing new idioms to say out loud existing wrongs, the ways certain phrase regimens
impose on others can be exposed, revealing both the wrong itself and the possibility of
bringing it to language, thus making the subject of politics. This phrase that finally
establishes the referent fills an ‘ostensive’ function: the existence of the referent can be
agreed upon, it is shown to exist (D, §28).
One can see immediately that this leads to a dilemma: the differend is the case of being
divested the means of giving proof of a wrong, of the right to testify to a damage. If a
wrong can be made to be a subject of litigation, a damage, if the inexpressible can be
brought to language, one only learns that there wasn’t a differend there in the first place,
what was to be expressed wasn’t truly inexpressible. Thus, the victim of a wrong wasn’t
a victim in the first place: even if all odds, against all she manages testify to her wrong,
her testimony is false. (D, §7.)
The ostensive function of phrases, the possibility of establishing a shared referent, is the
problem here. The problem of the holocaust denier shows how the problem is not the
‘common-sense’ existence of gas chambers, but being able to find a way of referring to it
in a way that the holocaust denier would be forced to accept, that is to say, to establish a
common genre of discourse that both could have a stake on (D, §33). The holocaust denier
is always willing to use the genre of discourse to his favour; the solving of the differend,
the establishing of the referent, requires not mere ostension, but a careful examination of
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the rules of phrasing and the genres of discourse, trying to find ways of bridging the gaps
between clashing phrase regimes and building a new, shared one.
This is what Lyotard means by ‘bearing witness’ to differends: the job of the philosopher
is to show the contingency of current genres of discourse and to institute new ones: the
feeling of sublime tells us that there is a wrong that cannot be put to words, and searching
must be done to find a way to express the differend disclosed by the feeling (D, §22.)
‘What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in politics, perhaps, is to bear witness to
differends by finding idioms for them.’ (D, §22). Trying to adjudicate irreconcilable
conflicts while staying in the old ways of speaking about them, the old idiom, would
merely be taking sides and prolong the differend (Williams 1998, 104): an example would
be trying to prove the existence of rape in a culture that does not have the conception of
what rape could be (Williams 1998, 105).
1.3 The Differend and Deliberative Democracy
Is this the sense in which we are not modern? Incommensurability, heterogeneity, the
differend, the persistence of proper names, the absence of a supreme tribunal? (D, §182.)
The legal metaphor employed by Lyotard reveals the political nature of the differend.
Williams (1998, 104 ff.) points out that the differend pertains to the need for making
judgments of justice, while the linguistic and institutional tools provided are lacking, or
the odds are clearly stacked in favour of the other side: this is the case of the language
game of the court being incommensurable with the language game of the plaintiff. Here
the only solution can be to try to find a new language game that gives the tools to bring
the wrong into language, making a just adjudication of wrong possible.
Lyotard, however, rejects the possibility of reaching a final understanding, a final
consensus: ‘The differend is reborn from the very resolutions of supposed litigations’ (D,
§263). Williams understands this as meaning that the mere possibility of achieving a
utopia bereft of real conflict would mean that particular differends could be sacrificed to
achieve this illusion of a totalitarian state where all differences could be managed
(Williams 1998, 108). Politics can only be possible if differends exist, if there is, on the
level of society, incommensurable difference that yearns to be spoken out.
The project of constituting an universal human history, a cosmopolitan, shared set of
understandings, or a single genre of discourse, as opposed to ‘savage’, particular histories
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and narratives, particular differends, is doomed to failure (D, §222). ‘The universalization
of narrative instances cannot be done without conflict’, he claims, ‘Traditions are
mutually opaque.’ (D, §227.) This is not due to the impossibility of translation per se, but
due to the fact that narratives, as systems of names belonging to different communities,
as different phrase regimes and genres of discourse, are exclusive of each other. This is
the way the differend is, in a sense, behind all politics. While there is a possibility of
negotiating, bringing the differend to language and to litigation, there is no tribunal that
could judge on it, because there is no universal, human, law (D §227).
Setting himself directly against a Habermasian concept of dialogical rationality aiming
towards consensus, Lyotard berates deliberative processes, the daily business of
democracy, of being an unjust mixing together of different genres of discourse. The
rhetoric and dialectical genres are used to present arguments that are then falsely
legitimated by mixing them with the normative discourse of law (D, §213–§214).
Deliberation merely allows political communities to somewhat function by hiding
differends, pushing them out of view and allowing politicians to choose the ‘lesser evil’
but not the good (D, §197). The good is circumscribed from the ends of deliberation
because, as noted before, there is no universal tribunal that could judge on the good, on a
law with universal normative power.
All deliberation achieves, Lyotard claims, is the creation or upholding of national
communities by allowing different narratives to somehow exist side by side, moving the
conflicts, the differends, to the borders of the community (D, §218). The deliberative
project, even if it cannot facilitate or ensure final understanding, thus has value as a
preserver of heterogeneity, but it too is doomed to lose out to the inevitable domination
by the ‘economic genre’, capitalism (D, §253). Political institutions will become
superfluous, as will national differences and the ‘deliberative political concatenation’ (D,
§253).
The differends between phrase regimens or between genres of discourse are judged to be
negligible by the tribunal of capitalism. The economic genre with its mode of necessary
linkage from one phrase to the next (Nos. 240, 241) dismisses the occurrence, the event,
the marvel, the anticipation of a community of feelings. (D, §252)
All that stands in the way of unfettered capitalism and subjugation of everything to the
logic of the exchange is the heterogeneity of phrase regimes and genres of discourse, the
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possibility of linking otherwise, the differend that always remains and can always be
borne witness to, that must be borne witness to. The the possibility of ending politics is
precluded by the nature of language itself. Lyotard thus ends his book on an exhortation
to bear witness to the yet inexpressible, and to start the book from the beginning. (D,
§264.)
The concept of the differend has not been without its critics. Seyla Benhabib takes up the
point: she criticizes Lyotard’s theory while defending a form of universalism against what
she deems as relativistic theories of political justification. Benhabib accuses Lyotard’s
theory of the differend of being a form of ‘framework relativism’, as differentiated from
the indefensible position of ‘anything goes’-relativism (Benhabib 2002, 28).
According to Benhabib, and as we have seen above, Lyotard’s conception of politics, if
taken seriously and taken to its logical end, leads to a thesis of incommensurability and
untranslatability between different phrase regimes, which could be understood as
frameworks for understanding. This would lead to an untenable political thesis: it is
impossible to reach mutual understanding over cultural differences, with all its related
political consequences. From the standpoint of a liberal democracy that maintains a
commitment to universal human rights, such radical relativism could not be sustained.
Benhabib also accuses Lyotard of purposeful conceptual vagueness, and derides him for
arranging under the concept of the differend a rubric of different meanings, ranging from
‘radical untranslatability in language to the sense of unfairness or injustice that may be
experienced when the language of the victor is invoked to describe the wounds of the
vanquished’ (Benhabib 2002, 30). We can accept this critique: Lyotard clearly refers to,
but does not explicitly differentiate, between different cases of the differend.
Williams has the most damning critique: the process of witnessing differends gives a
philosophical tool of feeling differences, but offers nothing in the way of formulating a
political system for legislating through them (Williams 1998, 117). He suggests that the
concept could still play the ‘role of the critic or of conscience in a speculative politics’
(Williams 1998, 117). I aim to use it do exactly that.  The concept of the differend is still
useful for conceptualising a political situation that resembles the latter meaning given by
Benhabib. The problems associated with using of language to establish the reality of
injustice is of far reaching consequence to any model of deliberative politics. In the
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context of political struggles for bringing oppression and injustice to view, often it is
language and idiom of politics itself that turns on the most vulnerable, making them
unable to voice their suffering.
Thus, as Young suggestes (Young 2000, 37, 72), the concept of the differend becomes
eminently useful when trying to see how deliberative democratic processes fail in making
it possible to establish the reality of existing injustices brought about by a confluence of
socio-structural factors that are occluded by those same structures. Understood this way,
the concept of differend becomes a key critical tool for revealing exclusion and injustice
that has taken root in political communication itself. Schaap’s analysis (2009) of the legal
situation of the Aborigines of Australia shows how the concept of the differend can be
put to use to conceptualise real-life injustice that stems from complex structural
oppression, excluding the marginalized from voicing their complaints in the realm of the
political.
I will use the concept of the differend to mark the silence, the inability to give reality to
one’s experience of that injustice, which follows from the nature of structural injustice
itself. It is not brought about by purposeful malice, perpetrated by wilful and knowing
actors; it results from the confluence of actions by perfectly well-meaning citizens within
the institutional arrangements of any democratic society (Young 2002, 420). Theories of
deliberative democracy, as I show below, exacerbate the problem by focusing too much
on consensus, the common good and reasonability as normative criteria that, despite the
good intention behind instituting them, actually exclude wrongs from the agenda of
deliberation. Despite its promise of bringing about a more legitimate form of politics,
deliberative democracy itself can become another way of excluding people from gaining
and using political power.
I move next to a critique of theories of deliberative democracy that maintain this
orientation towards consensus. Deliberative democracy has been, for the last twenty-or-
so years, the most promising candidate for a form of political theory that can bring about
a real transformation in the way democratic politics is done. This is due to its emphasis
on letting everyone affected by the decisions made in a polity have a say in making those
decisions. The concept of the differend comes extremely handy in showing the limits of
conceptions of deliberative democracy in addressing difference in a meaningful way.
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However, the project of deliberative democracy should not be completely abandoned due
to these flaws. Instead I propose an amended form of deliberative democracy that is
formulated largely after Iris Marion Young’s conception of ‘communicative democracy’.
I claim that this conception can grapple with differends in a meaningful way, by accepting
the structural difference constitutive of any society and making sensitiveness to the
possibility of exclusion the starting point of deliberative processes. Tackling questions of
visibility, audibility and the possibility of reaching shared knowledge, it presents a serious
attempt at a conception of democracy that can bring to deliberation the very structural
conditions of exclusion from politics, thus ‘bearing witness’ to differends. I propose a
version of communicative democracy that, while abandoning Lyotard’s all-encompassing
scepticism about progress and collective political projects, preserves his demand for
recognition of the possibility of incommensurable differences in the political realm.
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2. Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents
First, it is necessary to set out what is meant by deliberative democracy in the context of
this essay. I will use the ‘ideal deliberative procedure’ mapped out by Joshua Cohen
(1997) as the ‘standard model’ of deliberative democracy. I chose Cohen’s conception of
deliberative democracy due to its eminent simplicity and clarity that make it easy to
represent in the limited space here. It is also compatible with most conceptions of
deliberative democracy, especially with the discourse theory and communicative ethics
of Jürgen Habermas. (see e.g. Habermas 1996, 28 ff.).
It is especially important to understand how the normative conditions of freedom,
orientation towards consensus, communication through rational argument, and a focus on
the common good, are understood to be integral to this model deliberative democracy.
Then we can understand why these conditions can actually be understood to create and
uphold differends.
What is at question is the legitimacy of democratic processes, which is inextricably linked
to democracy’s normative claim of promoting the most just policies and outcomes
(Young 2000, 27). A democracy which produces and upholds differends cannot be just
or legitimate, and I will argue that the standard, consensus-oriented model of deliberative
democracy does just that. Making deliberative politics sensitive to the existence of
differends requires an additional focus on inclusion of difference and antagonism in
deliberation, and this means taking seriously the presence of structural inequalities in
participatory power in every society.
2.1 Deliberative Democracy as Ideal Procedure
Joshua Cohen’s model of deliberative democracy rests on the assumption that democracy
itself is a fundamental political ideal (Cohen 1997, 67), and that deliberative democracy
is the most democratic iteration of this ideal. The model comes in two parts, the formal
conception of deliberative democracy as an intuitive characterization of democratic
association, and a substantial ‘ideal procedure’, resting on the formal conception and
giving it normative conditions that real-life deliberative procedures can be compared to.
The formal conception can be summed as ‘an association whose affairs are governed by
the public deliberation of its members’ (Cohen 1997, 67). A deliberative democracy is an
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association that requires the commitment of its members to its collective institutions that
deliberation happens in, and to the results acquired by them. The association recognizes
the plurality of the aims between its members, and aims to maximizing its own legitimacy
by making as manifest as possible the connection between participation in deliberation
and its outcomes. Legitimacy is also gained by the exact terms of the association being
both results of deliberation and manifest as such to its members. The members are
assumed to recognize each other’s capacity for collective deliberation, i.e. capacity for
public reason-giving and acting on the result of public reasoning. (Cohen 1997, 72–73.)
Cohen’s formal conception provides an outline that collects different intuitions about
collective deliberation into a cohesive whole. Cohen then proceeds to give this formal
conception substance by building a normative theory of the ideal deliberative procedure.
The ideal procedure must fulfil these four conditions (Cohen 1997, 74 ff):
I1. Freedom. Participants are only bound by the results of their deliberation, and their
considerations are not constrained by prior norms or requirements.
I2. Reasonability. Participants must give reasons for their proposals, the goal being
that the force of the better argument should carry the day. Reasons are given to
bring others to accept the proposal, bearing in mind their commitment to
deliberation and the plurality of their aims.
I3. Equality between parties. Existing distributions of power and resources should
not affect the possibility of contributing to deliberation and should not play an
authoritative role in it.
I4. Rationally motivated consensus. Deliberation should aim to find reasons that are
persuasive to all ‘committed to acting on the results a free and reasoned
assessment of alternatives by equals’ (Cohen 1997, 75). If consensus cannot be
achieved, final decision among the alternatives deliberated upon is made by
voting.
Cohen then claims that the key concept of the common good can be inferred from the
relation of the ideal procedure to the formal conception. First, the formal conditions of
commitment and reasonability work together to ensure that only propositions that can
gain general assent, despite the differing aims of the participants, will be accepted, as
everyone is committed to act on the results gained through rational argument. Second, the
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plurality of the deliberation forces the committed participants to reconsider their own
motivations by finding reasons for supporting them. The end result is that only the
publicly motivated propositions survive the process, often heavily modified. The
deliberative process, thus understood, focuses debate on the common good. (Cohen 1997,
76–77.) What is important to note is that deliberation is not only about aggregating
existing interests, claims and ideals, but also allowing these the possibility to transform
through deliberation. This sets deliberation apart from mere bargaining between different
interest groups: the participants are forced set aside their narrow personal interests to gain
assent to their propositions. Instead, a civic sense of the common good should arise to
carry the day.
Participants can also be said to be autonomous, another key requirement for a functional
democracy. The normative conditions for deliberation aim towards neutralizing relations
of power and subordination (I1, I3, I4) and the formal conception itself requires the equal
recognition of every participant’s capacities; a deliberative democracy is thus committed
to providing conditions that enable everyone to exercise their deliberative powers (Cohen
1997, 78). The notion of plurality also recognizes every participant’s freedom to
formulate their own conceptions of a good life.
I take this model of ideal procedure as representative of and compatible with the most
common arguments put forward for deliberative democracy. The commitments to
conditions of the equality and autonomy of participants, reasonability through rational
argument, and orientation towards consensus and the common good are all shared by the
communicative ethics of Jürgen Habermas, for example.
Seyla Benhabib notes that these commitments force a move to a distinctive kind of
universalistic ethics. As each participant’s private needs are interpreted into
universalizable claims through a communicative focus on the common good, they become
represented in a discourse of rights and entitlements, seen through the point of view of
what Benhabib calls the ‘generalized other’.  (Benhabib 1985, 91.) I will below show that
this privileging of generalizable claims, as opposed to merely strategic, particular ones,
is one of the main problems of the standard model.
The deliberative model can reasonably be held to be more just than interest-based models
of democracy, since it increases the legitimacy of the decisions made, promotes
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cooperation between different parties and forces participants to step outside their own
narrow position on the issues under debate, ‘transforming the preferences, interests,
beliefs and judgements of participants’ (Young 2000, 26). Participatory processes also
have intrinsic meaning, being a means of developing and exercising human capabilities
(Young 1990, 92). Moreover a deliberative model of democracy has the virtue of
promoting reason over power in politics, as an antidote against pure interest-group
politics that parliamentary democracies have tended to conventionally exhibit (Young
1996, 122). This is a normative argument for democracy, and for deliberative democracy
in particular.
2.2 Deliberative Democracy in Non-Ideal Conditions
The ideal procedure leads, as Iris Marion Young notes, to circular reasoning about the
inherent fairness of deliberative processes (Young 2000, 34). Ideal deliberative procedure
expects justice, as equality and autonomy of participants, to obtain already, after which
everything the deliberation decides will be just. However, if equality and autonomy do
not already obtain, the deliberation will only present existing social relations of privilege
as an unalterable status quo, and justify and reinforce it through terms and language
perceived as generalized and neutral (Young 2000, 34). This is a case of a false consensus
and a differend, analogous to the case of the Australian aborigines I discussed above.
Proponents of deliberative democracy underline the importance of making democratic
processes more open for the public to take part in. The aim, after all, is to make them who
decisions concern the authors of those decisions. In reality, democracy is exercised under
conditions in which some groups are marginalized from political processes due to
structural relations of coercion and privilege. Young calls these the unjust conditions
under which we must operate (Young 2000, 34).
Deliberative processes are often, due to the unjust, non-ideal social and economic
conditions they take place in, fraught with differends: the very normative conditions of
the deliberation often leave many unable to voice their own perspective (Young 2000,
36). Even if those in less privileged social positions are formally included, deliberative
processes often privilege norms of communication that silence members of certain groups
without equal access to social and economic resources. The ideal procedure, being a tool
33
for normative assessment, simply assumes that these problems have been done away with
before deliberation.
Nancy Fraser speaks about what she calls ‘informal impediments to participatory parity’
that persist even after everyone is legally allowed to participate in the political processes
of the community. One aspect of this is that inclusion into decision making processes can
also act as a form of domination. After a minority group is included into the public
political process, it is often expected to follow the norms of communication and behaviour
already in place, set by those that already hold the power. Thus the perceived unity of the
polity, a transformation of ‘I’ into ‘we’, masks subtler forms of domination. (Fraser 1990,
64.) The very norms of communication and language make them impossible to address:
different ways of speech and behaviour are systematically marginalized and silenced by
the very communicative structure of the political sphere.
Models of deliberative democracy include norms of discussion that the deliberation is
supposed to follow in order to be legitimate. While norms concerning, for example,
reasonableness, and a requirement to engage in reasoned argument do serve to facilitate
democratic decision making, often norms of deliberation privilege argument from shared
premises to mutually agreeable conclusions as the preferred mode of political
communication. Most political communities also privilege certain styles of political
communication over others (Young 2000, 56). While argument is, of course, a sine qua
non for reasonable political communication, this presumption does hides within a source
of exclusion.
The standard model of deliberative democracy also assumes that for deliberation to be
possible in the first place, we must assume a framework of understandings shared by the
participants. Under the standard model, deliberation proceeds by participants putting
forward propositions and then giving reasons for accepting them. These reasons must
always refer to what is understood to be a shared reality, a shared conceptual framework.
We could understand this framework as analogous to what Lyotard calls a genre of
discourse. This unity of the participants as occupying a framework of shared
understanding is threatened by the possibility of difference (Young 1996, 125). The focus
on unity occludes the possibility of a differend existing under it, a wrong that can’t be
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articulated in the framework. Still, the framework is not attended to, but presented as
neutral.
A part of the non-ideal conditions deliberation must function under is that this framework
is not neutral and universally shared, but largely influenced by social and economic
structures underlying it. However, it is presented as neutral. Thus it is the case that some
claims cannot be fitted within this shared framework, making it impossible to even bring
them into debate. When this happens, we are dealing with a case of the differend. Where
no shared premises for argument exist, injustices cannot be communicated, and the
deliberative process is taken over by those already who already are in positions of social
and economic power. (Young 2000, 37.)
The concept of ‘exclusion’ characterises the way structures work to keep certain social
groups from participating in political processes. Exclusion could be understood as the
structural conditions that cause and uphold differends by defining the scope of
deliberation.
Young outlines two forms of exclusion: external exclusion and internal exclusion (Young
2000, 52). External exclusion refers to the way structures work to keep certain groups left
out from or from fully participating in public discourse and political processes. For
example, mass media often leaves out the point of view of minority groups when
discussing social issues, and privileges the economically powerful when portioning
screen time between political actors. Money, as everyone knows, often translates into
political power. Skin colour, ethnicity and gender too often define who gets to have a say.
Young calls the tendency of political communication itself to favour those already
privileged in relation to the less advantaged internal exclusion (Young 2000, 55). As
noted, liberal democracies usually have procedures in place that mitigate the influence of
these structural factors somewhat, allowing the disadvantaged to get their voices heard.
However, getting access to the fora of political decision making and to the possibility of
having your say does not necessarily mean that anyone will be ready to listen. More often
than not, the very norms that communication operates under make it impossible for
certain groups to get their voices heard and understood and their claims taken seriously.
Certain types and patterns of speech are favoured over others. Certain forms of
35
communication are privileged over others. Certain types of argument are accepted as
favourable over others.
Susan Bickford, writing from the perspective of Arendtian political theory, notes that
plurality, the very condition of politics and public life, is threatened by powerful
economic and social forces that tend to define and perpetuate non-neutral standards of
communication. Economic and social power has the capability of blocking, distorting and
shifting our listening attention, taking our attention away from certain political concerns
and turning it towards others. What connects these powerful interests and politics is the
means of communication and political action itself, language. (Bickford 1996, 93).
Privileging argument as a mode of political discussion also privileges norms of high level
of articulation, dispassionateness and disembodiedness as ‘reasonable’ modes of
expression (Young 2000, 38). This is seen as taking the standpoint of the ‘generalized
other’, rising above petty, particular concerns and laying claim to a higher amount of
objectivity andc reasonableness. It is important to note that these modes of expression are
usually culturally linked to a highly educated, socially and materially well-off speaker.
Expressions of emotion, wide gestures, nervousness, different accents and styles of
speech are often deemed to speak of the ‘lack of objectivity’ of the speaker, making what
is said easy to dismiss from deliberation (Young 2000, 39).
History, unfortunately, shows how these norms have been used to exclude cultural
minorities, women and poorly educated groups and individuals from making their voice
heard in public. This is a case of the differend: the form and tone the discourse takes
presumes certain qualities of the speaker, and this presumption works to make it
impossible for some to speak, if only out of fear of ridicule. This not to say that we should
not attempt to foster and admire such deliberative virtues such as skilful enunciation, skill
in rhetoric, and ability to represent oneself and one’s claims clearly; just that these should
not be thought of as conditions for entry to deliberation, or as a mark of the speaker’s
superior claim to possessing rationality or reasonableness (Young 2000, 80).
A predetermined focus on consensus, then, makes deliberation turn away from the real
issues disagreed upon and casts the discontent into the part of the troublemaker. The
standard model of deliberation is ill prepared to accept actual conflict and difference
within it, and as Miriam Solomon notes, presumes criticism and dissent it to be
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‘dangerously disruptive by creating divisions that need to be overcome’ (Solomon 1999).
This leads to deliberation actively privileging unity, despite it being evident that the
society underlying it is deeply fractured along social and cultural lines. Casting aside
one’s particular claims and setting one’s mind on the common good becomes merely
actively propping up those already holding the means and wherewithal to uphold unjust
social structures for their own benefit.
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3. Communicative Democracy
In order to be able to ‘bear witness’ to differends, deliberative processes must be recast
into a more inclusive mould that refuses consensus as both a starting point and a goal, and
privileges difference in perspectives instead of unity. I propose a conception of
communicative democracy based on the work of Iris Marion Young (1996, 2000) as a
revision and an amendment to consensus-oriented conceptions of deliberative democracy.
This conception functions within an adversarial understanding of politics that reflects the
conflict, antagonism and difference inherent in every society. It attempts to make
deliberative processes more capable of using this difference as a resource for a more
robust and inclusive democracy, a democracy that can more easily allow the ‘articulation
of new idioms’ to express previously differends inherent in every political arrangement.
I use the term ‘adversarial politics’ to denote a conception of politics that abandons
consensus and the common good as the goals of democracy. While democracies must be
able to make decisions, they must not attempt to hide away the differences in power and
the resulting antagonism and conflict constitutive of all societies. The word ‘adversarial’
is, I believe, descriptive of a political struggle that remains on the level of democratic
politics, without abandoning it and devolving into lawless antagonism. The word
‘adversarial’ is used by Susan Bickford as a counterpoint to ‘unitarian’, consensus-
oriented models of democracy, such as the standard deliberative conception above
(Bickford 1996, 16). An example of adversarial politics is the conception of ‘agonistic’
politics as put forward by Chantal Mouffe (e.g. Mouffe 2005a, 80 ff.).
Chantal Mouffe makes a crucial distinction between the ‘ontological’ and ‘ontic’ levels
of politics:  all societies are incommensurably antagonistic on an ontological level,
democratic politics are what happens on the ontic (Mouffe 2005b, 9). I propose a
conception of communicative democracy that tries to theoretically connect the two in a
way that is conducive to solving differends.
When the causes of differends have taken root inside deliberative processes themselves,
dispelling them requires an account of the society and polity the deliberation concerns.
To establish the reality of structural injustice and its effect of excluding some from
political power and consigning them to silence, a conception of deliberative democracy
must necessarily be able to reflect within it on a functional ontology of social structures.
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An account of structurally constituted social groups is an integral part of any such model,
as the basis for a politically salient theory of situated and shared group perspectives.
Deliberation is beset by differends, because we have only situated, perspectival access to,
and knowledge about, our shared social reality, and some perspectives are unjustly
privileged over others.
First, a politically salient account of the underlying ontological level of society must be
given. This will be the establishing of a common referent, or reality, that the ontic level
of adversarial politics and political communication can refer to. The suffered injustices
that are caused by the unjust structural arrangements at the ontological level of the society
become Lyotardian wrongs, as the shared discursive frameworks influenced by those
same structures make it impossible to express them in the political level, leading to the
formation of differends (Young 2000, 37). To remedy the situation, an understanding of
the ontological level of society and a way to refer to it are required. I will make use of
Iris Marion Young’s work on the concept of structurally constituted social groups to
conceptualize the incommensurable social antagonism underlying all politics as
structurally constituted group difference.
After establishing a politically salient way to refer to the ontological level of society, I
will then show how differends can be ‘witnessed’ in the ‘ontic’ realm of deliberative,
democratic politics. For this I will give an account of an adversarial, ‘communicative’
conception of deliberative democracy that is able to include structurally constituted
difference in deliberative processes. Difference can be understood as a resource for
making democracy more reasonable, legitimate and just. This is achieved by making
democracy more sensitive to differently situated perspectives on a shared reality. I base
this idea of a perspective-sensitive deliberation mainly on the conception of
communicative democracy as developed by Iris Marion Young, and use the work of
thinkers like Chantal Mouffe, Susan Bickford and Seyla Benhabib to broaden the scope
of the argument for inclusion of different perspectives in deliberative processes.
The differend is, as Williams has noted, a useful concept for evaluating positive political
theory because it can reveal what the accepted genres of discourse in any political
community are unable to talking about (Williams 1998, 117). At the same time, it leaves
us ‘without the political or indeed philosophical system to legislate or think through those
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differences” (Williams 1998, 117), unable to give any prescriptions for acting on insights
thus gained.
I explicitly abandon Lyotard’s scepticism about progress and negative critique of
progressive politics for a positive conception of politics as doing justice to difference. It
could be said that the ability to sink into cynicism and passivity and denying one’s own
part in social processes is a privilege in itself, one that those struggling for political
representation of their issues simply do not have. I still retain the use of the concept of
the differend as a key critical tool for evaluating democratic processes: where differends
exist, justice cannot. I do accept Mouffe’s notion that all political orders are based on
some form of exclusion (Mouffe 2005b, 18). The work of justice is, in an imperfect world,
never done: as noted, to extinguish all differends would be to extinguish the possibility
of politics altogether and would mark the beginning of a utopia, an illusion as dangerous
as it is alluring (Williams 1998, 108). However, the work of uncovering differends, of
doing justice by finding ways to talk about silently suffered injustices is, I believe, forced
upon us by the very nature of democracy itself.
Paul Healy (2011a, 2011b) has given a reading of Young’s conception of communicative
democracy that criticizes her for overemphasizing difference. Healy advocates a
conception of ‘transformative dialogue’ (Healy 2011b, 306 ff.) that, while agreeing with
Young on the need to do justice for difference in the realm of politics, emphasizes a
hermeneutical process of reaching understanding and a ‘fusion of horizons’ as a
requirement for a conception of communicative democracy to fully function as intended.
I contend that while reaching shared understandings about the ontological level of society
is, of course, required for democracy to function, the hermeneutical project goes too far
in emphasizing cultural differences. The goal of communicative democracy should be the
revealing of differends and doing justice to difference in democratic processes, working
towards a more just politics. The focus on reaching hermeneutical understanding, I argue,
can come in the way of doing justice to difference itself.
I begin in chapter 3.1 with a discussion on adversarial politics as opposed to politics
aiming towards consensus. After that, in chapter 3.2 I propose a conception of social
groups as a politically salient way of understanding the antagonism constitutive of the
‘ontological’ level of society. I show that this conception of social groups is integral to a
40
conception of communicative democracy that aims to be sensitive to the existence
differends and to witness them. This conception of social groups provides the link
between the ontological and the political, providing an account of social groups that can
then, through communication of their shared perspectives, present claims in the realm of
the political.
In chapter 3.3 I look at how deliberative processes, by referring to this ontology of the
social as constituted by situated positions, are better able to include within themselves
differentiated social perspectives. This is achieved through an acknowledgement of the
existence of social positions and groups, and through this, the existence of differentiated
perspectives to a shared social reality. This awareness of structurally constituted
difference is the key for solving differends that underlie political processes, as this
inclusion of different perspectives results in ‘enlarged thought’ and gives the conditions
for democratic deliberation to reach more objective knowledge about the shared reality
that it concerns.
Then, in chapter 3.4. I show how the standard model of deliberative democracy rests on
an untenable normative demand of ‘reasonable’ communication being argumentation
from shared premises. I propose as an amendment the standard conception of deliberative
democracy, Iris Marion Young’s schema of three additional modes of communication:
greeting, rhetoric and narrative. These modes provide the communicative basis for better
inclusion of difference in political processes, as reasonability is recast as willingness to
listen to perspectives differing from one’s own. I cross-reference Young’s many writings
on deliberative politics with insights gained from other theorists for as nuanced a
conception as possible.
Then, in chapter 3.5 I examine Paul Healy’s argument that to reach the full potential of
the project of communicative democracy, the framework of deliberative discourse should
be abandoned altogether and replaced with the notion of hermeneutical ‘transformative
dialogue’. I examine the criticism of Young by Lorenzo Simpson that informs Healy’s
argument, and see if there is something to be gained from addressing it.
After presenting a differend-sensitive conception of deliberative democracy that
emphasizes the notion of communication and calling it communicative democracy, the
terminology can become confusing. I will generally use the term ‘standard model [of
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deliberative democracy]’ to refer to the consensus-oriented view of deliberative
democracy and presented above. I will use the term ‘communicative democracy’ to refer
to the amended conception of deliberative democracy presented in this chapter. The term
‘deliberative democracy’ refers to the larger rubric of deliberative theories of politics that
both aforementioned conceptions belong in.
3.1 Adversarial Politics
‘Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice as a value is neither
outmoded nor suspect. We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not
linked to that of consensus.’ (PC, 66)
Paradoxically, abandoning consensus is required if deliberation is to be able to move
away from domination by the interests of the strong. While a commitment to shared
democratic procedures is needed for a polity to cohere together, a strong emphasis on
consensus serves only to encourage putting difficult issues off the agenda. It is important
for the functioning of democracy that disagreements be aired openly and solved in a
political process, before the possibility of discussion is lost as conflicts over interests
become too great to settle politically (Young 2000, 44).
Through presenting and commenting on different conceptions of adversarial politics by
Chantal Mouffe, Susan Bickford and Iris Marion Young, I propose that an adversarial
conception of democratic politics is necessary for solving differends hidden under an
assumed consensus. This means that deliberative political communication must able to
reflect the constitutive pluralism and resulting antagonism of society, without descending
into open hostility. The pluralism constitutive of politics must be brought from the level
of sociological facts, ontology, to the level of the ontic, that is, language, shared
understandings and politics. This gives deliberation the tools it needs to address
differends hidden within the deliberative system itself.
The standard, consensus-oriented model of a deliberative democracy is averse to
difference within itself. While the formal conception acknowledges the plurality of the
participants, the substantial normative commitment to common good and unity seems to
override real-life difference having a possibility of affecting the proceedings. As argued
above, the normative condition of orientation towards consensus results in deliberative
procedures that cause and exaggerate differends. If differends are to be attended to and
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solved, a conception of deliberative democracy must be able to accommodate
incommensurable difference in perspectives and goals while aiming towards just
decisions. Only by bringing the multiplicity of perspectives that exist in every society to
the arena of deliberative politics can more just outcomes sensitive to existence of
differends be expected to be formulated.
Young argues that privileging unity and consensus and setting out a shared understanding
of the aims of politics as the basis of deliberative democracy act against the very
normative ideals of deliberative politics itself (Young 2000, 41.) Deliberative processes
are the preferred model of democracy, because unlike mere competition between interest
groups, deliberation brings out the plurality of viewpoints in any given society. As noted,
under conditions of social inequality a focus on the common good serves only to exclude
the disadvantaged from deliberation and keeps difficult issues off the political agenda,
creating differends. The assumption of a shared common good and political unity based
on shared understandings does nothing but obviate the need for the transformation from
self-centered to enlarged thought that is a reason deliberative democracy is advocated in
the first place.
An adversarial understanding of democracy does not preclude the possibility of politics
that can conform to existing institutional political frameworks such as a representative
system of liberal democracy. I claim that formerly unseen possibilities of increasing
democracy are inherent in modern-day democratic political systems, even if they are
seemingly founded on a universalistic understanding of consensus and unity either as a
perquisite of, or the goal of democracy.
Different social groups in any society exist in and due to differentiated relations of power
between them, leading to differentiated political goals and a fracturing of the social body.
Politics that aim towards a common good, consensus and unity do not articulate this
structural difference in the realm of politics, which serves to cause and hide differends.
At the same time, for a democratic political community to exist at all, the collective
interdependence of its inhabitants and the need for collective institutions that follows
must be recognized: this is imperative for democratic politics that includes difference to
be possible (Young 1996, 126).
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As a solution to this dilemma, a democracy must be able hold on to necessary shared
political institutions, such as representative parliamentary bodies, while dispensing with
the underlying assumption of unity and the shared goal of consensus. Young calls this
form of political unity ‘weak unity’, as opposed to a model of deliberative politics aiming
for a common good and a community of shared understandings, a ‘strong’ unity (Young
1996, 126). An adversarial politics is based on a rejection of consensus, but not a rejection
of shared political institutions altogether.
Difference should be understood as a resource for a more just deliberative democracy,
not an impediment to it. This requires also that in non-ideal conditions, deliberative
processes must attend to particular group interests. They can and will collide in a way
that may be irreconcilable. This incommensurability of goals should not be suppressed,
but brought into the realm of deliberative politics, in which these conflicting claims can
receive their articulation and adjudication between them can be done, ultimately by
voting, if necessary.
I follow here the lead of Chantal Mouffe, who sets her conception of ‘agonistic’ politics
against democratic politics aiming towards consensus. According to Mouffe, ‘the belief
in the possibility of a universal rational consensus’ makes it impossible for participants
in deliberation to formulate and decide on clearly differentiated alternatives (Mouffe
2005b, 3). The consensus-oriented liberal democrats acknowledge the pluralism of
society, that is, the plurality of conceptions of the good in any given society, as an
empirical fact. However, they then begin to devise models to relegate this pluralism to
the private sphere, in order to achieve the possibility of reaching a reasonable consensus
on the shared political stage. This is actually negating the fact of plurality and making all
differences within society irrelevant. (Mouffe 1996, 246.) Politics is turned into the
negotiation of conflicting interests, eliminating from politics the underlying antagonism,
violence, power and repression, that is, the source of politics itself (Mouffe 1996, 253).
However, this sleight of hand merely makes this conception of democracy irrelevant.
According to Mouffe, we should relinquish the idea that a ‘rationally motivated’
consensus, that is, a consensus without exclusion, is possible. A society in which relations
of power, exclusion and repression have been removed from the political stage is a society
from which pluralism and indeterminacy have been extinguished, and democracy itself
with them. (Mouffe 1996, 254).
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What is needed, according to Mouffe, is an approach to politics that takes pluralism and
the following antagonism as axiomatic, the starting point of politics (Mouffe 2005b, 9).
This refusal of consensus and a ‘final destination’ of politics is actually the fact that keeps
democracy alive, as confrontation and conflict show that a democracy is still inhabited
by pluralism (Mouffe 1996, 255).
This antagonism, the basis of adversarial politics as proposed here, needn’t lead to a
radical incommensurability as impossibility of reaching understanding, like feared by
Benhabib (2002, 31). Denying all possibility of political understanding actually fails for
the same reason as does a focus on consensus: democratic politics, in order to be actually
possible, requires a space for construction of collective identities. A politics that refuses
all forms of ‘we’ and commensurability also refuses to engage with existing relations of
power and privilege that are the very subject matter of adversarial politics (Mouffe 1996,
247).
This is also a damning indictment of Lyotard’s denial of the possibility of a ‘we’ (D,
§155). James Williams (2000, 122) notes that to Lyotard, no project of constructing an
account of a collective identity (‘humanity’, ‘the French’) can be a legitimate one, as no-
one can be the legitimate author of such account. Lyotard’s negative criticism of all
collective political identities and projects collapses politics into the very cynical
antagonism it aims to criticize.
A politics of this sort collapses into the very competition between minorities or interest
groups that it aims to destroy. A project of pluralist democracy resides in establishment
of a set of institutions in which relations of power and exclusion can be contested, without
being masked under a false rational consensus that does away with politics altogether
(Mouffe 1996, 248).
Susan Bickford argues that what is needed is a conception of communicative interaction
that allows both an adversarial and a unitarian model of deliberation. A model of
communicative democracy that can both serve as a vehicle for finding out commonalities,
while not suppressing conflict for the sake of consensus, could both advance common
interests while solving our conflicting ones (Bickford 1996, 16). She especially criticizes
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative interaction for its lack of an adversarial
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model of communication: for Habermas all deliberation is, in its roots, aimed towards
consensus through the force of the better argument (Bickford 1996, 17).
Young notes that a focus on consensus obviates the need for a transformation from self-
regarding to enlarged thought: a genuine encounter with plurality leads to all participants
learning something from each other, and forces them to take into account not only their
own interests but also those of others. If a deliberative process can only appeal to what is
commonly shared, the opinions, interests and viewpoints of others never need to be
seriously taken into account (Young 2000, 42).
3.2 Group Difference
A theory of communicative democracy as sensitive to the problem of the differend
requires a politically salient conception of the ontological realm of the social, as opposed
to the ‘ontic’ realm of the political. This gives communicative democracy the basis that
it needs to establish a shared referent, one that those who feel their perspective is excluded
from deliberation can ground their claims for inclusion and justice on.
The establishing of a shared referent, viz. a shared social reality, enables the bridging
between heterogeneous ‘genres of discourse’ and the articulation and institution of new
ones. I propose that this should be understood as creating the possibility of articulating
new perspectives into this shared reality that have hitherto been excluded, and including
them into deliberation. This articulation itself is, in part, made possible by the new modes
of communication proposed by Iris Marion Young (2000, 52 ff.) that I discuss below.
What is needed is a conception of the social as divided into structurally constituted social
groups. These groups find their political expression in deliberative processes that are
capable of including within themselves even radically different perspectives on a shared
reality. I use the work of Iris Marion Young to establish a concept of group that is based
not on a ‘cultural’, substantive group identity, but an account of social structures that
position people into relations of privilege and disadvantage as relational to other
positions. This ontology of the social realm as structurally constituted will be necessary
to establish a conception of communicative democracy that can include within itself a
multitude of conflicting perspectives without aiming to subsume them under a presumed
consensus.
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The concept of ‘group’ underlies all attempts to form a theory of group-differentiated
politics. If the subject of politics is taken to be a group instead of an individual or a collec-
tive of individuals, we face a plethora of problems. How is a group to be defined? How
could different groups have varying rights and responsibilities? How are groups to be
represented in a democratic system? What consequences does group-differentiated
politics have concerning the ideal of universal democratic rights? Can a group, however
it is defined, ever be a political subject?
The current focus on groups in political theory has its roots in the emergence of so-called
‘new social movements’ in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and in the philosophical debate about
multiculturalism, identity politics and ‘struggles for recognition’ that surfaced in the early
1990s with the writings of Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, Will Kymlicka and others.5
Movements for women’s rights, gay, lesbian, trans and queer rights, alongside with
movements campaigning for the rights of immigrants, other cultural or national minorities
and the disabled have advocated the recognition of difference in political life, often
through group-based politics that break the received liberal view of politics as equal,
individual citizens coming together to decide on shared political issues.
First I focus on the way the concept of group has been used in the philosophical debate
on the possibility of group-differentiated politics. I argue that debate has, perhaps
mistakenly, centred on groups understood as identity groups, and casting them as
inherently ‘cultural’. This has led to political theorists on all sides of the debate to
advocate group-centric solutions that lead to highly problematic conclusions concerning
individual rights, while also neglecting the structural social and economic issues behind
the conflicts that manifest themselves in the cultural realm.
To understand how our own knowledge of our shared social reality is perspectival
requires an understanding of the social as structurally constituted. These structures are
experienced as ‘already there’, and people find themselves sharing certain social positions
within these structures. This is the basis for understanding this structurally constituted
difference as group difference, as people sharing the same social position find common
cause together. The framework of adversarial politics that the conception of
5 See Taylor (1994), Honneth (1996), Kymlicka (1995).
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communicative democracy proposed in this essay functions in, is a group-differentiated
one.
Social groups, however, should not be understood as political subjects. Making groups
subjects in their own right would mean giving them substance that they do not have: this
would only move the struggle for getting one’s perspective out there back to the level of
the group itself, as the defining of the criteria for group membership would become the
site of political struggle.
I propose, using the work of Iris Marion Young, that groups should not be represented in
the political realm by elevating groups into political subjects themselves, but by making
deliberative processes inclusive of different group perspectives. The concept of social
group gives an ontological account of structurally constituted social positions that
condition the perspectives of those that find themselves in these positions; it is these
perspectives that must be able to find their expression in the political realm, not group
identity itself. This is a way to reconcile both the principle of the individual being the
basic political subject, and the need for shared group experiences to be represented on the
political level for differends to be solved, the differends being the silencing of some group
experiences and perspectives in the public realm.
3.2.1 Culture, Identity and Groups
Tackling the problem of groups in politics has tended mean assuming that groups can be
conceptualized as cultural groups. David Scott notes that for political theorists, culture
has become ‘the universal ground and grid and horizon of difference’ (Scott 2003, 104).
These cultural groups are clearly defined and separated from each other: members of a
single group have a shared cultural heritage, a shared religion or some other shared
attribute that can be lazily understood as vaguely analogical to cultural identity.6
This has tended to oversimplify things: religious groups, immigrant groups and other
social groups such as women or LGBT people are seen as similar groups, in need of
6 A prime example of this tendency is Will Kymlicka’s famous discussion of multiculturalism in Canadian
context in his Multicultural Citizenship (1995). Kymlicka presents the case for a group-differentiated
democracy as a ‘multicultural’ one, casting all ‘minority’ groups from homosexuals to Orthodox Jews into
‘cultural’ groups, whose claims for justice and/or differentiated treatment in legislation can then be
adjudicated as claims for cultural recognition of minority groups.
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similar recognition in public life. The discussion about group-differentiated politics thus
tends to circle around the term ‘multiculturalism’, with its associated nefarious political
baggage. This conception of groups as based on cultural identity must done away with.
Why culture, then? Culture is taken to be something unproblematic, already there: cultural
groups are clearly and neatly delineated from each other from the start, allowing theorists
to give out easy prescriptions for dealing with this diversity. This leads to assuming that
there actually exist such things as stable and easily definable cultural groups. Defining
groups as cultural groups and making this the basis of group-differentiated politics in the
context of multicultural societies, however the concept ‘multicultural’ is defined, raises
questions about the meaning of the concept of culture itself. Taking cultural groups as the
focus and primary subjects of group-differentiated politics leads to problems that could
render the whole concept both theoretically and politically unviable. I will first examine
the critique levied against concept of collective rights accorded to cultural groups. I will
then present arguments against the very conception of culture that the concept of cultural
groups as political subjects is based on.
Seyla Benhabib takes issue with the concept of identity behind cultural groups and
questions the link between individual and collective identity. Why should an individual’s
struggle for authentic identity be subordinated to a struggle of any collective, cultural or
otherwise (Benhabib 2002, 54)? Benhabib notes that we tend to understand cultures,
especially ones other than our own, as united and coherent wholes. This holistic view of
cultures tends to lead to the assumption that ‘Western’ democratic values like basic
political rights, for example, are not universal and merely an alternative political opinion
among others. (Benhabib 2002, 24.) The danger of moral relativism and its political
consequences leads Benhabib to reject claims to group-based rights and group-
differentiated politics that are based on mere cultural differences.
Benhabib’s argument is given in defence of liberal, democratic, and individualist
universalism. Benhabib claims that, properly interpreted, ‘moral and political
universalism […] are not irreconciliable with the recognition of, respect for, and
democratic negotiation of certain forms of difference’ (Benhabib 2002, xi). Benhabib is
concerned that reifying difference erodes the basis of liberal democracy, which is properly
understood not inimical to, but welcoming of difference. Benhabib prefers to relegate
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expression of difference into ‘the multiple associations, networks and citizens’ forums’
of a functioning liberal public sphere, from where different cultural groups can have an
influence on public policy without being understood as political actors per se (Benhabib
1996, 84).
Jürgen Habermas, like Benhabib, argues that the idea of group-differentiated politics is
based on a false opposition between difference-blind individualism and difference-
sensitive group-centric politics. Habermas claims that correctly understood, a liberal
theory of rights is not blind to cultural differences or social conditions. Quite the opposite:
a consistently actualized system of rights protects the integrity of the individual in the
context in which his identity is formed, without requiring an additional system of
collective rights. This actualization, of course, requires collective action through social
movements and political struggles, but the theoretical basis of liberal democracy is sound
enough without taking groups into account. (Habermas 1999, 207 ff.)
Benhabib notes that privileging of cultural identity markers over other markers of
collective identity, like gender, sexuality or income level, illegitimately reifies certain
cultural and national groups over others. There is also a conflict between a liberal defence
of individual rights and the right of cultural groups to self-preservation. (Benhabib 2002,
60.) Defendants of cultural groups are forced to the conclusion that when need be,
individual liberty must be subordinated to the needs of the collective cultural group.
Other questions abound: why should institutionally recognized cultures be privileged over
less formally defined cultures and/or other social groups? Are we supposed to separate
cultural groups from other groups? What is ‘culture’, anyway?
Iris Marion Young also takes issue with the demand for special representation to cultural
groups. According to Young, groups do not deserve representation in decision-making
bodies just so ‘they can express their culture in public discussion or be recognized in their
distinctiveness’ (Young 2000, 146). According to Young, representation of marginalized
groups should be undertaken with a firm understanding of larger economic and social
processes that underlie cultural group difference, and requires other normative arguments
in addition to a commitment to political equality (Young 2000, 142).
The impulse behind using cultural groups as an ontological basis for multicultural politics
is understandable. Anne Phillips notes that we need politically salient categories to bring
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hierarchies of power into view. For example, while feminism has demonstrated the
problems associated with the slippery category of ‘woman’, many feminists still argue
that it is still needed to bring about meaningful political change (Phillips 2007, 15). In
order for emancipatory politics to be possible, we need conceptions of identity and
politics that do not regard group membership as a mere fiction. Culture, likewise, matters,
and some notion of culture is needed for inclusive politics that do not merely mask
preserving existing inequalities as ‘difference-blindness’.
The problem with reifying cultural groups into political actors as themselves is more
insidious. Phillips notes that the recognition of diversity that was meant to benefit
minority cultural groups, has become a ‘cultural straitjacket’, ‘forcing those described as
members of a minority cultural group into a regime of authenticity, denying them the
chance to cross cultural borders, borrow cultural influences, define and redefine
themselves’ (Phillips 2007, 14).
Young also argues that justifying group representation in terms of experiences, interests
and opinions allegedly shared by a group, as a group, reduces all members of a group to
a common essence, suppressing difference within groups and also possibly making
understanding across group divisions impossible (Young 2000, 143).
American sociologist Rogers Brubakers notes the problem of with what he calls
‘groupism’: the tendency to take ‘sharply differentiated, internally homogenous and
externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life’.  In the context of
multicultural politics, this leads to ‘the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races
as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed’. (Brubakers 2002,
164.) David Scott argues that political theorists are less about understanding culture as
sociologists or anthropologists understand it, and more about creating a culture-concept
that suits their own political theory of liberal democracy (Scott 2003, 96).
Taking cues from both Brubakers and Scott, Phillips says that culture has in modern
political theory taken the place of terms like ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’, which are seen as
problematic and essentializing (Phillips 2007, 56). The way the term is used still often
veers dangerously close to thinly-veiled racism: the often heard ‘insurmountability of
cultural differences’ that is used as an excuse for supporting attempts to curb immigration
is a good example. This ‘billiard ball’ view of cultures as separate groups knocking into
51
each other (Tully 1995, 10) should be recognized as false. Because of this, Phillips
demands that political theory should recognize cultures as what they are: ‘historically
changing, open to a variation of interpretations, and internally contested’ (Phillips 2007,
82). If cultures have borders, they are highly permeable. Branding individuals with
discrete cultural tags is impossible.
While the liberal pluralist impulse behind multicultural politics is commendable, marking
culture as the pre-eminent domain for difference and separating it neatly into groups with
clear boundaries and unified agency is a threat to liberal individual rights. Assuming that
cultural groups are unified and stable has the added effect of denying actual agency to
members these groups, casting them into the easily vilified part of the exotic Other.
Speaking of using the ‘cultural defence’ in the courtroom, Phillips notes that courts in the
United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe still easily cast accused members of minority
cultures into the stereotypical roles assigned to them, patronizingly explaining their
criminal behaviour through a narrative of clash of cultures where ordinary explanations
would readily suffice (Phillips 2007, 98).
Cultural identity forms an important part of an individual’s personal identity, but the place
given to it in multicultural political theory paints all members of minority cultures as
products of their culture, incapable of understanding universalizable moral norms and
principles and incapable of grasping the concept of liberal individual rights.
Modern liberal political theory has, understandably, focused on identity politics due to
the pressing need for political theory cognizant of increasing cultural diversity in Western
societies. However, like Phillips notes, political theorists do what political theorists do:
they actually think about power (Phillips 2007, 19). Speaking about culture and identity
is an easy way to map out inequality and power in a theoretically salient way, but leads
to unsavoury outcomes.
Building a conception of groups on mere identity, cultural or otherwise, leads to
conclusions that are both theoretically and politically undesirable: the disadvantaging and
marginalization suffered by many minority groups is not properly understood or solved
by cultural arguments that jeopardize individual rights. ‘Culturalizing’ minorities presents
them as carriers of exotic otherness, which can lead to actively worsening their lot in
public discussion. It becomes easier to deny agency, or even humanity, to members of
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these groups. As Phillips notes, politics of identity only tend to cause ressentiment and
the dogmatization of identity (Phillips 1996, 144). Political claims based to cultural group
difference need to be based on a liberal theory of individual rights.
The concept of a group as a politically salient category is still important, even with all the
problems associated with it. It is impossible, I believe, to properly conceptualise actual
inequalities in power and exclusion from political processes without an account of how
they experienced collectively, as a group, be the suffering group women, a sexual
minority, people stuck in poverty, racial or ethnic minorities or any other disadvantaged
group. Injustice is usually suffered due to unjust social structures that make some
perspectives unable to be even voiced in the realm of the political, while giving too much
weight to others. When this happens, we are faced with a differend.
I will next use Iris Marion Young’s work on the concept of social groups to show that the
differend pertains to groups: individuals experience a wrong as collectively suffered. This
is due to individuals finding themselves sharing a structurally constituted social position
with other individuals. Every social position offers a unique perspective into a shared
social reality, but some of these perspectives cannot be adequately voiced in consensus-
oriented deliberative processes. If differends are suffered as a collective, a group, the
political solutions to solving them should be based on finding solutions for including
more collective perspectives, more group experiences of wrong, into deliberation.
3.2.2 Social Structures and Social Groups
In Responsibility for Justice (2011), Iris Marion Young begins outlining her conception
of social structure by beginning from the concept of social position. She follows
sociologists such as Pierre Bordieu in considering members of a society as positioned
before their interactions by their relations to each other (Young 2011, 57). These positions
are defined by larger socio-economic structures; individuals find themselves from
different social positions that influence the way they act and both enable and constrain
the choices they can make (Young 2002, 420 ff.). It is this account of social structures as
positioning individuals that is the basis of the ontology of a shared social reality, and acts
as the ontological foundation for my proposal for an account of communicative
democracy.
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To illustrate the point, Young uses the example of a working single mother named Sandy
who is looking for a home after being wrongfully evicted from her apartment. Due to a
combination of low income, a severe shortage of affordable housing, poor public
transportation options and lack of money for a rent deposit she faces the prospect of
homelessness (Young 2011, 43). Her options are constrained by a number of structural
restrictions that she is powerless to change: as a woman without a college education and
working in a sex-segregated labour market, she is forced to work in low-paying service
jobs that are usually located far from affordable housing. Facing a questionable eviction
from her rental apartment, she has, due to lack of resources, no recourse to contesting her
eviction against the large housing developer who bought her previous apartment block to
turn it into condominiums. She is, without having a choice in the matter, in the social
position ‘vulnerable to homelessness’ that she shares with a number of other individuals
(Young 2011, 45).
Often social positions like this are intimately tied to categories such as gender, ethnicity
and class. For example, immigrants moving into Western societies often find themselves
in similar situations defined by low-quality housing, low income and quasi-
institutionalized prejudice against individuals with an ‘ethnic’ background when applying
for jobs and housing on the open market. These wider social outcomes are the result of a
confluence of institutional rules, mobilization of resources and physical structures that
are relatively stable over time. The confluence of individual actions within these
institutional relations result in collective consequences that are usually not the result of
any person’s or group’s intention. (Young 2002, 420.) The concept of social structure
denotes these relations that result in objective constraints in the lives of some individuals,
while enabling others to take advantage of them.
Often the actions of individuals and individuals result in concrete physical manifestations
of these actions. Cities are zoned and built in a certain way, some areas gain prestige over
others, some places have better public transport than others. Often architecture itself
positions individuals in a certain way, making certain spaces inaccessible to handicapped
persons, for example. The material and institutional conditions of our lives have been
constructed with a certain type of ‘normal’ person in mind that gives certain groups of
people tangible advantages over others (Young 1994, 725).
54
Young uses Martin Heidegger’s concept of ‘throwness’ describes the way individuals
usually ‘find’ themselves in a shared social position, as members of a group that they feel
affinity for, without having a choice in the matter (Young 1989, 260). It could be claimed
that the capability to forget one’s social position and be indifferent to it is itself a rare
privilege. In an inegalitarian society divided by such structural axes of inequality as race,
gender, class and sexuality, merely being able to not see oneself as a member of a group
is a marker of power (Bickford 1996, 102).
Through focusing on structures, be they material, institutional, or merely embodied in
reflexive habits, it can be shown that despite the problems associated with theories group-
differentiated democracy, a conception of social groups is important for a conception of
deliberative democracy. A large part of bringing group difference to bear on political
decision making is about conceptualizing group identity in a way that is politically salient
and allows politics to move past questions of identity and recognition and towards a focus
on doing justice. A concept of social groups as constituted by social structures gives a
politically salient ontology of group difference.
In order to understand the difference between this approach and so-called identity politics,
it is required to understand how social structures lead to formations of collectives of
similarly-situated persons that face structural injustice due to the ‘confluence of
institutional rules and interactive routines, mobilization of resources, and physical
structures’ these persons find themselves in (Young 2002, 420).
In her article ‘Lived Body vs. Gender: Reflections on Social Structure and Subjectivity’
(2002), Young discusses social structures as a basis for a politically salient category of
gender.  Theories of gendered identity and subjectivity have ignored the way large-scale
social structures position people differently in relations of privilege and disadvantage
(Young 2002, 410). Gender is just one of these categories, like race, class or ethnicity,
that should be understood as a shorthand for a set of structures that position persons.
Instead of general group identities that add together to constitute individual identities like
‘pop-beads’ strung together (Young 2002, 417), we need to turn our attention towards
social structures.
Individuals live out their live in unique sociohistorical contexts and settings, and form
their individual identities in a discursive relation with their surroundings and the people
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they meet. Individuals also form their identities in relation to many group identities, some
of which are more important to them than others. Group affiliations like culture, religion,
class and gender are essential building blocks of what make an individual. However, it is
problematic to claim that some of these group affinities are essential to any individual. If
we accept individual rights as the starting point of any liberal politics while wishing to
formulate a model of genuine group-differentiated democracy, it becomes necessary to
build an ontology of groups that surpasses the logic of substantial identity.
A large part of Young’s account is formed by the uncoupling of group membership from
the logic of substantial identity. Every one of us relates to a number of social groups that
have group differences cutting across them. The members of a religious group are
differentiated by age, gender, race, age and so on. Young asks the question: is an
individual’s identity somehow an aggregate of all these different identities? (Young 2000,
89.)
According to the logic of identity, a group is an entity by virtue of the attributes which
inhere in it, some essential, some not so. This leads to confusion as members of any group
may share interests and affinities with members of other groups, and may have little in
common with the other members of the group. There also always are individuals
possessing the required attributes for membership who do not seem to experience or
identify themselves as part of the group (Young 2000, 88). An account of groups based
on identity thus seems to imply a substantial account of the qualities required for a
membership of a group, the demand that the group have a set of shared interests everyone
can agree on, and that the group identity should be somehow constitutive of individual
identity.
This problem has both ontological and political dimensions. It is quite impossible to build
a coherent account of social groups based on shared attributes. All attempts at doing so
anyway lead to marginalization within groups: group membership based on identity
inevitably silences some voices while the perspective of others is considered ‘normal’
(Young 2000, 89). This is, again, a creation of another differend, another illegitimate
‘we’.
Young’s alternative to the substantial account is to present a relational account of group
identity. Instead of looking for substantial identity within a group and fixing these groups
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as somehow rigid, well-defined and bordered entities, we should attempt to find out how
individuals relate to different group categories through socio-structural positioning.  This
solves the problem of a collective identity: there is no collective entity apart from the
individuals that compose a group (Young 2000, 89). These individuals relate to each other
through sharing a structural position in a web of social relations. One can be white, male,
an immigrant, lower-class, upper-class – all these positions relate to each other, but do
not determine the personal identity of those in these positions.
This ‘intersectionality’, individuals always existing in a cross-section of differend social
axes, gives a way to conceptualize an important intuition. Building group identities is
always a personal project of individuals, but individuals often find common cause with
those who have a similar perspective into society, conditioned by similar experiences of
being in similar social positions (Young 1997b, 393). Individuals are agents, and as agents
they actively choose to relate to certain identities and groups of people. These choices are
conditioned by the social positions they find themselves in, but not conclusively defined
by them (Young 2000, 101).
As human beings we do form our identities in a relation with our surroundings and the
positions we are in relative to others. At the same time we can act freely towards these
positionings, building our personal identities along the way, choosing our group affinities
as we go. These affinities are neither determined, nor the basis for membership in a social
group. The social group itself has to be understood as a concept free from the baggage of
personal identification.
We are free to affirm and reject different parts of our identities, but we are usually not
free to choose the social positions we find ourselves in. Positioning is a useful metaphor:
it helps to point out how similarly positioned individuals have similar experiences and
knowledge about the workings of society: the social position of an individual conditions
their perspective on society, as it conditions their possibilities and social relations (Young
2000, 102). The fact that we share social positions with others explains how we often find
common cause with similarly positioned individuals, enabling us, as political actors, to
draw on this knowledge of multiple positioning and difference in social and cultural
relations for different purposes (Young 2000, 102).
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The shift from the logic of substantial identity to the logic of relational identity is essential
for understanding how Young’s approach differs from an approach to group-
differentiated politics as based on identity. It avoids the problem of shared cultural
membership or other attributes as a prerequisite for belonging to a group. It also avoids
the problem of making the group political subject.
Instead of finding ways to somehow adjudicate particular claims made by groups defined
by their identity, politics should be about attending to the perspectives of differently
situated individuals. This will bring to view the structures that position different
individuals into similar situations and cause them to suffer from structurally constituted
injustice or enjoy structurally constituted privileges as a group, formed in relation to other
groups. This provides for a concrete ontology of the social as resulting in group difference
that does not fall prey to the pitfalls of cultural relativism, or rejecting the possibility of
assumed universality as the basis of law-making as the political activity par excellence.
The most basic political subject must remain the individual, but it is supremely important
to bring to politics the situatedness of individuals in a net of social relations as a politically
relevant component of our lives that requires an appropriate political expression. Young
illuminates this point by contrasting social groups to aggregates and associations.
An aggregate is a classification of individuals according to some attribute, e.g. the colour
of their skin or the make of the car they drive (Young 1990, 44). The aggregation happens
from the point of view of outsiders and does not express a shared subjective social
experience – a good example is an insurance company aggregating smokers for the
purpose of actuarial tables (Young 2000, 89). This classification of people due to external
attributes is not enough to consider aggregations groups. Social groups put individuals
into determinate relations with each other, and must be understood as based on a shared
social position and the relationships between individuals this engenders.
Associations, on the other hand, are a form of group that individuals purposefully
constitute to accomplish specific objectives. Relations between individuals within these
groups are defined by particular objectives, explicit rules and set roles. The forms these
groups take vary from small neighbourhood committees to labour unions and political
parties. (Young 2000, 90.) However, individuals join associations freely and do not
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consider them to define one’s identity as being a member of an ethnic group might.
Individuals constitute associations as already formed persons (Young 1989, 260).
Social groups must be set apart from both aggregates and associations. Social groups are
not based on mere shared attributes or formed as a result of individual choice. Social
groups must also be understood as different from cultural groups (Young 2000, 91).
Young acknowledges the role that culture plays in people’s lives and notes that cultural
affinities have a large role in the formation of groups. She, however, defends her focus
on social groups on grounds of wanting to highlight structural injustice: conflicts between
cultural groups over recognition are usually tied to ‘control over resources, exclusion
from benefits of political influence or economic participation, strategic power or
segregation from opportunities’. (Young 2000, 105.) While cultural issues are important,
actual political conflict usually has its roots in other forms of inequality.
When talking about social groups as having a basis in social structure, unlike groups based
on identity, it is not to discount politics based on identity group membership. Instead, it
means that claims made by groups must be formulated and seen in a new way, not as a
desire for particular treatment, but as claims to justice, voiced as a group suffering from
a structurally constituted wrong that the same structures occlude from general view, a
differend.
Understanding this account of group identity is important to seeing how politics of
difference can be a resource for a more democratic politics. Greater political inclusion of
marginalized groups is a goal that democratic politics should strive for, and establishing
an account of group identities in conjunction with a structural account of social groups
shows way towards a conception of group-differentiated communicative democracy. This
conception must move forward from multicultural politics of the type that only takes into
account individual group identities and leaves the basis of this identity shrouded in the
nebulous sphere of culture and intersubjective identity formation.
The existentialist term ‘throwness’ is useful in illuminating how social groups differ
fundamentally from groups predicated on identity, as in multicultural politics, or groups
understood as interest groups, aggregates, or associations. The group affinities one can
feel towards one’s social groups are a result of deep identification with that group, but
this identification stems from the simple fact that individuals who find themselves
59
similarly structurally positioned often find common cause with each other, sharing the
same privileges and disadvantages associated with that position.
3.3.3 Social Groups and Identity
Social groups are, in everyday society, largely coterminous with what we would call
‘identity groups’, such as sexual, gender and cultural minorities. However, it is important
to realize that to be politically salient, the basis of group difference that matters politically
cannot be assumed to lie in the nebulous sphere of individual identities, but on structurally
constituted social positions. Collective projects of raising consciousness of group identity
are still politically relevant: they give the means for individuals sharing the same social
position to come together and share their collective, positioned experiences, resulting in
demands for political visibility and change.
Individuals tend to find it meaningful to seek reaffirmation of their identities with cultural
projects of identity-building with their peers, empowering themselves through these
means. Shared cultural projects turn the shared social experiences and knowledge these
groups possess into new cultural meanings, something the wider society can understand
and relate to. At the same time they give for individuals the tools to understand the way
social positions are structurally formed and politically upheld or changed, and this
understanding is the necessary basis for engaging in further political action. (Young 2000,
103–104.)
It is also important to note that an individual can relate to multiple group identities without
any of them necessarily being a ‘defining’ one. Bickford calls this psychological makeup
of everyone existing in a cross-section of differend axis of structural positions the ‘plural
self’ (Bickford 1996, 122). We relate to a number of social positions and thus to multiple
perspectives in our lives: our identities are not constituted by these numerous affinities,
but conditioned by them. It is important to see that most of us are, in some way, in
contradiction with ourselves, in a conversation with the numerous givens that condition
us. Bickford refers to this as ‘our embeddedness in the socially constructed givens of our
existence, and our capacity to present ourselves self-consciously in a way that engages
but does not simply reflect those givens.’ (Bickford 1996, 125.) The concept of
substantial, essential, group identity is, for the most part, a fiction that serves to silence
some at the expense of others. This does not mean that group identities are irrelevant, but
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that they are an integral part of the social perspectives that need to be reflected in political
deliberation.
While finding oneself thrown into a social position does not determine one’s group
affinities, it is reasonable to say that members of actual disadvantaged social groups tend
to find common cause together. Organizing discourses and cultural expressions that take
shared experiences of cultural deprecation and harmful stereotypes of the surrounding
society, and turn them into messages of empowerment that aim to reverse these
stereotypes, is something that almost all political movements based on social group
experiences have historically aimed to do (Young 2000, 103).
Cultural processes within social groups aiming towards positive identity building should
be seen as constructive to this end, while not immune to criticism, either from inside or
outside the group. Many groups that are in ordinary multicultural politics seen merely as
possessing an identity often suffer from structural injustice, not merely in economic
terms, but cultural, too. The cultural stereotypes and stigma attached to group identities
such as ‘Black American’ or ‘woman’ are harmful in themselves, affecting the members
of these groups negatively (Taylor 1994, 26).
Cultural building of positive group identities to combat the effects of such negative
stereotyping is, as Young notes, the cornerstone of all political movements aiming
towards effecting structural change towards a more just society: ‘their function is partly
to encourage solidarity among those with a group affinity, and a sense of political agency
in making justice claims to the wider society’ (Young 2000, 103).
This identity building and the assertion of these group identities are necessary for political
mobilization towards making justice claims to the wider society, and have been in history
used, for example, by movements of the working class and women in their fights against
political exclusion. However, as Young notes, this exploration of cultural identity is not
mere assertion of group difference and identity against other identities, or ‘politics of
recognition’ as critics of multiculturalism would put it (Young 2000, 104).
While recognition of group identities can be a political end in itself, at least one level of
recognition is best thought as a condition for political communication that aims towards
justice (Young 2000, 61). Young argues strongly against a politics of difference that
focuses on lack of recognition as a political problem independent of other relations of
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inequality or oppression (Young 2000, 105). Instead of setting recognition itself as the
goal of more inclusive politics, it is needed to be understood that lack of visibility and the
inability to get the voice of one’s group heard is itself a form of structural injustice that
needs to be addressed as a part of a whole, a structurally constituted web of relations that
privilege certain groups over others. A theory of deliberative democracy that fails to meet
this methodological requirement will only be able to reflect non-ideal social conditions,
not actively change them.
What is at stake is not mere preservation of identity against a wider, universalizing
tendency in society. The lack of cultural recognition is not separate from other forms of
inequality or oppression, but usually tied to control over resources, and exclusion from
the benefits of political influence and economic participation (Young 2000, 105). Usually
the justice claims of disadvantaged groups refer to shared experiences of structural
inequality more than assertion of cultural difference and autonomy (Young 2000, 105–
106).
This understanding of social groups as constituted by social-structural relations is, I
believe, necessary to understanding group-differentiation in deliberative democracy not
as mere articulation of group identities and the recognition of these identities, but as
making it possible to create the idioms that are able to articulate actual structurally-
constituted injustice that remains outside politics, as a differend. Structural injustice takes
many forms, from suffering from negative stereotypes and cultural identities to more
concrete forms of inequality in income, availability of housing and employment, to name
examples. Most importantly, relations of disadvantage and privilege affect considerably
the ability of different groups to take part in the public life of the community and its
political processes.
The structural approach to groups is not inimical to cultural identity politics. Cultural
identity is a part of every political subject, and this difference needs to be addressed and
attended to in deliberative politics. However, deliberative politics should be about
articulating claims for justice, grounded in concrete, shared experiences of injustice that
can be shown to result from objective social structures, instead of trying to ground them
in the nebulous sphere of cultural identities and misrecognition. This establishing of a
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shared social reality should not be done through disputes over cultural membership and
identity.
3.3 Situated Perspectives
As shown above, differently positioned groups of people have differentiated, situated
knowledge of their social position as it exists relative to other positions. For deliberative
processes to be really inclusive of difference, these different perspectives need to be made
to weigh on deliberative decision-making. I believe we can accept as the maxim of
communicative democracy that decision making should be, as much as possible, take into
account the views and interests of those who the decisions made actually affect (Young
2000, 27). Differentiated, situated perspectives thus need to be integrated into democratic
processes, the goal being an inclusive, adversarial democratic politics, sensitive to
differends.
I propose that the ontological antagonism of society constituted by structured difference,
to be reflected in the realm of political, requires an understanding of social structures and
social groups and an adversarial understanding of politics. It must be possible to contest
these structures through the public articulation of group-differentiated experiences of
wrong and injustice. I argue that this is the work of solving existing differends that a focus
on consensus and pre-existing shared understandings only serve to reinforce and hide
from view. Thus an account of social groups and group difference based on social
structures is an integral part of the model of communicative democracy.
No-one should have to bracket away their specifity when entering the political realm, as
this requirement of generality merely masks existing particular structural injustices and
exclusions (Young 2000, 113). An orientation towards an ideal speech situation that can,
by definition, reach consensus also serves to keep difficult and contested matters off the
agenda, reinforcing the position of those already in power (Young 2000, 43) and making
it impossible to even begin a process of coming to grips with the possibility of structurally
differentiated difference existing in society.
For differends to be solved, group difference must be brought to bear on political
processes. Democratic processes do not become democratic by just formally including
everyone; they also must attend to the social relations and structures that position
individuals differently and condition their understanding of society, knowledge of it, and
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the opportunities they have (Young 2000, 83). Achieving fuller knowledge of the
workings of society as a whole, of its social positions, structures and processes, not only
helps the disadvantaged to publicly articulate claims of justice, but it also enables
democracy to better predict the effects of actions and policies (Young 2000, 117).
Young (2000, 117) sums up the kinds of situated knowledge people in differentiated
social positions have as such: ‘(1) an understanding of their position, and how it stands in
relation to other positions; (2) a social map of other salient positions, how they are
defined, and the relation in which they stand to this position; (3) a point of view on the
history of the society; (4) an interpretation of how the relations and processes of the whole
society operate, especially as the affect one’s own position; (5) a position-specific
experience and point of view on the natural and physical environment.’ I claim that if we
are ready to accept the plurality of understandings on such basic things as the perceived
‘right’ history of the polity that is the subject matter of deliberation, we are immediately
setting on a path quite different from a consensus-oriented conception of deliberative
democracy.
How do individuals relate to social positions, then? In an illuminating example, Susan
Bickford reworks Hannah Arendt’s classic allegory of the world relating and separating
us like a table (Arendt 1958, 52). Bickford compares the way group interests and
knowledge collide in the life of a single individual, to sitting around a table. Each person
has his own chair, or unique location in the world, but we understand more about the
situation of those on the same side of the table with us. At the same time it might seem
that we have something more in common with those at the same end of the table than
those at the far end – we can belong to multiple groups at the same time. The table itself
makes it possible for us to explain our situation to those opposing us, while also separating
us from them. And if we assume that the table is round, our group affiliations become
even more complicated, as we live in a web of social relations in which the borders
between groups are often blurry. (Bickford 1996, 86.)
Bickford’s example underlines the importance of communication to democratic
processes: we can go around the table and exchange spots, but it will not be the same as
talking to the person who was there before. When we step into the public to communicate
with each other, our representations of what the situations and interests of others shouldn’t
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already formed: we need communication and listening to come to judgments about how
others see their own situation and how their perspective influences their opinions and
interests. (Bickford 1996, 87 ff.)
Making deliberative processes receptive to communicating situated perspectives does not
mean replacing the process of deliberation with a social science of structures that is then
used to ‘determine’ the opinions and interests of actual, living individuals as members of
groups. Communicating and sharing situated, perspectival knowledge is meant to make
it possible for individuals to give reasons for why they hold the personal opinions they
hold and have the mix of group interests they have by first establishing reality of their
position relative to other positions and then sharing their perspective conditioned, but not
determined, by that position. While no two individuals share exactly the same position,
the concept of the social group is still the most politically salient way to map out shared,
situated interests: everyone sits on their own chair, but has a lot more in common with
those sitting on their side of the table than with those on the other (Bickford 1996, 86).
This brings out an epistemological problem: while we live in a shared reality, no-one can
lay claim to objective knowledge of it. We cannot simply take the point of view of the
neutral observer: we are always situated ourselves in a ‘web’ of relations to others. If the
perspectivality thesis is taken seriously, by recognizing that there is no neutral point of
view, we arrive dangerously close at claiming that there is no possibility for deliberation
to reach objective knowledge of the condition of the society, period. Radical relativism
about our ends and means abounds.
However, Young proposes that our perspectives are, while particular, still perspectives to
a shared social reality. The way forward is to recognize that everyone’s perspective
should bear on deliberation: increasing epistemological objectivity on the condition of
society is gained by allowing differentiated situated perspectives be brought forward in
adversarial deliberative processes (Young 2000, 112).
This resembles Hilary Putnam’s ‘epistemological justification’ of democracy: criticizing
what the calls the ‘transcendental’ arguments of political philosophers like Rawls and
Habermas, he instead proposes a return to the pragmatic political thought of John Dewey.
Putnam argues that a society acts most intelligent when it engages in democratic
communication that allows different viewpoints come to free contact with each other,
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resulting in a more objective account of the social conditions of the society as a whole.
Objectivity is here understood as the basis for a pragmatic commitment to using
intelligence to solve societal problems. (Putnam 1990, 1671 ff.)
Objectivity in deliberation does not consist of appealing to an assumed set of shared
understandings, but in establishing the possibility of deliberation relating to a shared
social reality through the different plural perspectives of its participants (Young 2000,
114). When difference is not seen as a threat to deliberation but a resource to it, the
normative conditions of reasonability and reasonable consensus in Cohen’s model can be
traded to a condition of making sure that everyone’s perspective is attended to in
deliberation (Young 2000, 24).
The epistemological argument against the standard model of deliberative democracy also
underlines the fact that society functions more intelligently when it has more knowledge
about its functioning. It isn’t merely enough to take more just politics as the starting point
of deliberative democracy: for democracy to actually make just decisions, it requires
objective knowledge about its social processes, its structures and the conditions it has to
act within (Young 2000, 117). This social knowledge is gained by abandoning a unitary
view of society, and attending to the fractures within.
Young also notes that the epistemological argument for inclusive democracy does not
suggest that people in disadvantaged positions are somehow ‘epistemologically
privileged’ as to the workings of a given society. As individual human beings, regardless
of our social position, we are all liable to exaggerate the nature of our situation, to lie
about it and to shift blame about it to where it does not belong. These partialities can,
however, be revealed as our claims are taken into a discussion in which they are
reasonably engaged with. (Young 2000, 117.)
Explicit recognition of difference in aims, interests and situations among the participants
to deliberation breaks the hold the privileged groups have on defining their experience
and opinions to be the general norm of society (Young 2000, 116). If difference is left
unattended, the powerful  can cast difference into the lot of the ‘deviant’ while claiming
to present their perspective and interests as the common good of the society as a whole.
This tendency of universalizing the situation of the privileged as the norm, creating a false
consensus that exists with differends underneath it, is best combated by a commitment to
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bringing light the situated knowledge and perspectives of all social groups into the
democratic process.
This situatedness of perspectives also effects how we should understand reciprocity
among participants in deliberative interaction. In the standard conception of deliberation,
all parties are in a ‘symmetrical’ position relative to each other (Young 1997a, 340). The
conditions of rationality as giving of mutually understandable reasons for arguments, and
equality of participants in deliberation, demand that to be intelligible, arguments should
be given in such a way that every participant should be able to reverse perspectives with
others. This means putting themselves in the place of the other to see the world from the
other’s point of view, leading to mutual identification (Young 1996, 128). If we take the
structural situatedness of every participant as constitutive of the difference between them,
this becomes impossible, which leads to what Young calls ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’
between subjects: each participant has an irreducible point of view that transcends the
others, as ‘each brings to the relationships a history and structured positioning that makes
them different from one another’ (Young 1997a, 351).
Consensus-oriented conceptions of deliberation erase difference from view by assuming
that partners in deliberation, in principle, share the same perspective, despite the avowed
plurality of the participants. To gain a truly pluralistic and more objective view of society,
the irreducibility of different perspectives must be assumed, while communicating over
the difference between them must be possible. Only this true encounter with difference
can lead to increased social knowledge between participants in deliberation (Young 1996,
128).
Taking into account the way socio-economic structures position individuals differently
into social groups leads to an agonistic model of adversarial deliberative politics that
eschews the illusion of common good and social unity for a pluralistic understanding of
society and the nature of deliberative processes. I will next turn to the ways in which the
conception of deliberative communication needs to be overhauled to include the
differentiated situated perspectives in society, to make possible the communication over
the differences between them, and to make most of the richness of possibilities they offer
for enriching deliberative democracy.
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3.4 Inclusive Communication
I have shown that the concept of deliberative democracy discussed in Chapter 3 upholds
differends through its ideal claim to reasonableness through reaching for consensus and
the common good. The ideal model of deliberation begins to actively shore up existing
inequality when applied to societies that operate under non-ideal conditions, leading to
upholding of existing differends and even the formation of new ones, as changes in the
social fabric remain unacknowledged in the realm of the political. How then to ‘break the
circle’, to begin democratically changing a system that actively paints its own inherent
unfairness as neutrality?
I have suggested above, after Iris Marion Young, a move away from the ideal ‘standard
model’ of deliberative democracy towards a communicative one. Young advocates the
move from the concept of deliberation to the broader concept of ‘communication’,
because it ‘better shows a connection between the ideal of democracy and social justice’
(Young 1993, 125). The notion of communication, unlike that of deliberation, takes as its
starting point  a distance and difference that participants in in communicative interaction
must reach out over towards each other (Young 1993, 128). The unity of shared
understandings underlying the concept of deliberation cannot be taken for granted.
Neither can it be taken as granted that everyone that should be included in deliberation
has been included. Young notes that what is important is that democratic communication
should be alert to the possibility that some groups might be excluded from deliberation,
and be willing to find ways of communication that include as many as is possible (Young
2000, 37).
Iris Marion Young’s conception of communicative democracy is meant not to replace,
but to amend existing models of deliberative democracy. I agree: despite its perceived
failures, the standard model of deliberative democracy needs to be developed and taken
further, not abandoned. If we abandon consensus as a credible goal and try to set out a
deliberative democracy that is willing to engage in adversarial politics, the ideal norms
of deliberation need to be altered and amended, too.
This means working over the ideal norms of deliberation, especially that of
reasonableness as argumentation forward from shared premises. According to Young, to
make political communication more inclusive, the norm of reasonableness must be
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redefined as ‘being open to listening to others and having them influence one’s views,
and expressing one’s own claims upon them in ways that aim to reach their assent or
understanding.’ (Young 2000, 39.) I suggest that to facilitate solving differends, a theory
of communicative democracy has to be able to accept alternate modes of communication
in addition to argumenting from shared premises. If shared premises or shared
understandings cannot be legitimately set as the starting point of deliberation due to the
adversarial nature of politics, the very difference in perspectives must be made the starting
point of deliberative processes. This will make it increasingly possible for difference to
manifest itself and for formerly silenced grievances to become articulated in the public
sphere.
Young presents three additional modes of communication that supplement argument
while not supplanting it: greeting, rhetoric and narrative. These modes are designed to
create the conditions needed for bringing difference to deliberation, allowing different
perspectives, interests and cultural meanings to be better articulated and heard (Young
1996, 129). It is this new audibility and visibility that are meant to facilitate the creation
of ‘new idioms’ to express wrongs that are ‘already felt’, if not expressed, as Lyotard
would put it.7 I will next review Young’s main arguments for the inclusion of these modes
of communication and provide more arguments from other thinkers where I see they are
applicable.
When there is a lack of shared understandings about the issues under debate, additional
modes of communication are designed to make it possible for this lack to be bridged by
providing communicative tools for increasing shared knowledge. This enables
participants in deliberation to reach ‘enlarged thought’: communicative democracy lays
stress on these additional modes, especially that of narrative, because it adds to the social
knowledge of everyone concerned and forces the participants to see the limitedness and
7 Jacques Rancière, following Aristotle’s Politics, illuminates this point by making a distinction between
mere sound, phône, and understandable speech, logos. What is denied to those left outside politics is not
the capability to make sound: animals make sounds when in pain or when enjoying themselves, and the
phōne of those left outside politics is interpreted as just that, a mere animal-like voicing of these ‘lower’
passions. What is required for taking part in deliberation is the capability to become understood, to be
recognized as a partner in negotiations, a being with logos. Rancière’s theory of politics as the ‘setting of
the stage’ (mise-en-scène) in which the everyday life of the community happens and as ruptures within it
has many interesting connections to Lyotard’s thought that are sadly outside the scope of this thesis. See
Ranciere (1999), Chapter 2.
69
perspectivality of their own point of view (Young 1997b, 403). These modes of
communication are also meant to help situate the participants in relation to each other,
acknowledging the relational structural positioning in the realm of the social and
reflecting it in the realm of the political.
Greeting. Greeting is the mere act of acknowledging the other participants, either by
expressions of greeting (‘Hello! How are you?’), or by other expressions of politeness,
deference and respect. The most banal flattery, lengthy introductions before speaking and
simple gestures of giving and taking food, that is to say, taking care of the other and
acknowledging their Otherness, are instrumental to creating the kind of rapport that can
develop into a true communicative relation, especially if there is a conflict both sides
seem unable to resolve (Young 2000, 59).8
Aside from the practical acts of greeting, greeting is also a gesture of political recognition,
acknowledging other’s uniqueness and difference and respecting it, while also respecting
the other’s equal right to take part in political decision making. By gestures of greeting,
those in power show their willingness to engage with in a discussion with the groups these
gestures name, a discussion that leads to decisions that everyone included have taken part
in formulating. It is this starting point, the naming of participants, showing them as
differentiated from each other, and the acknowledgement of the obligation to listen to
everyone’s perspective and to take it seriously, from which real adversarial deliberative
political interaction can begin from. (Young 2000, 61.)
Susan Bickford approaches something resembling the concept of greeting when she
claims that paying attention is one of the conditions of meaningful political interaction.
Developing an Arendtian conception of political action, to Bickford taking political action
is to be actively willing to engage with the fact that all human action is uncertain, due to
its inherently conflictual character that stems from the inherent plurality of the human
condition and the uncertainty of that which can be achieved through human agency.
(Bickford 1996, 24, 29.)  Engaging in deliberation thus requires paying attention to the
8 In September 2013 much was made of president Barack Obama greeting the Iranian president Hasan
Rouhani in Persian during the first phone call between the leaders of the two countries since 1979. I choose
to believe that the mere public gesture of president Obama saying ‘Khoda hafez!’ (‘God be with you!’ in
Persian) to president Rouhani during a publicized phone call probably did more to improve American-
Iranian relations than the preceding weeks of intense secret negotiations had done.
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relevant features of each situation and, more importantly, paying attention to who one is
deliberating with (Bickford 1996, 60). This paying attention is how the ‘whoness’ of those
one deliberates with is revealed to us: without paying attention we are liable to consider
only that what the others are, that is, the combination of sociological categories they fit
in (Bickford 1996, 59).9
The concrete political function of greeting is to ensure that everyone formally included in
a deliberative process is actually attended to. Greeting should also be understood as
presenting functional criteria that real-life public debates and political processes can be
compared to. Greeting can be said to have taken place when all social groups that a debate
concerns are at times referred to in the second person instead of the third (Young 2000,
62). If the debate does not attend to the perspective of some groups and does not consider
itself accountable to them, it is quite probable that these groups have been excluded from
the debate and are thus victims of a differend.
I wish to offer Seyla Benhabib’s discussion on the difference between ‘concrete’ and
‘generalized’ other as illustrating the relation of care that greeting as a mode of
communication implies. Benhabib calls for a moral relation to a ‘concrete other’ instead
of a ‘generalized’ one: we should approach our communicative partner not only as a
fellow member of a community rights, obligations and entitlements, but also deserving
of our solidarity and care as a concrete, individual being within a community of needs
(Benhabib 1985, 94). This recognition should be the basis of all subsequent political
communication, not the goal of it, as it opens communication to the possibility of
previously uncommunicated wrongs that a strict focus on ‘generalizable claims’, that is,
claims presented in the context of seeking consensus, over ‘particular’ ones would have
occluded (Simpson 2001, 64).
By greeting, the very reality of the difference between the participants in politics is
established, and at the same time, the reality of the underlying ontological difference.
Greeting thus shouldn’t only be understood as consisting only of the concrete act of,
9 This Arendtian distinction bears a marked similarity to the attempt to make a distinction between ‘logic
of substance’ and ‘logic of relation’ discussed above in chapter 3.2.2. See Chapter 3 in Bickford (1996) for
a detailed exposition of these categories in the context of Arendt’s ‘politics of appearance’ as presented in
Human Condition (1956).
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basically, shaking hands and saying ‘Hello’. It is also the assumption of a willingness to
treat the other as also deserving of our recognition as unique and different from us.
Rhetoric. The function of rhetoric as a part of political communication has been contested
from the days of Plato and his famous distinction in the dialogue Gorgias between speech
that is oriented towards the search for truth and mere rhetoric, which aims only to
manipulate the emotions of those it addresses. James Bohman (1988, 187 ff.) claims that
Habermas preserves this distinction in his distinction between ‘communicative’ and
‘strategic action’. Habermas sets communicative action as inherently aiming towards
reaching understanding by giving rational motivations to another, separate from strategic
action that aims to influence others through means such as sanctions and promises of
gratification (Habermas 1990, 58). Habermas’ approach is, according to Bohman,
completely dependent on John Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts (Bohman 1988, 187).  Rhetoric is considered a perlocutionary act and
belongs in the nebulous sphere of ‘strategic action’, as its results are uncertain and
uncontrollable and not dependent on giving rational reasons. This makes it suspect in the
context of rational deliberation that aims towards rational consensus.
This distinction faithfully recreates Plato’s distinction between speech aiming towards
truth, and mere rhetoric that aims to manipulate others in the context of deliberative
politics. Young notes that Habermas tries to separate reason-giving illocutionary acts of
communication from perlocutionary attempts to influence others through aiming to create
specific effects in them. However, both illocution and perlocution are necessary: all
communicative action both relies on asserting context-specific meaning and on creating
a specific effect on its audience (Young 2000, 66). This is often crucial to reaching mutual
understanding and on motivating others to respond.
An example of this is Bohman’s own concept of ‘emancipatory’ speech (Bohman 1988,
199 ff.). Bohman uses Habermas’ distinction to create a category of perlocutionary speech
which preserves the distinction, while claiming that speech aiming towards democratic
emancipation also includes aspects of the reason-giving function of illocutionary
communicative action, like orientation towards reaching understanding. Emancipatory
speech takes place in a situation in which participants in deliberation do not share
sufficient understanding to engage in rational communicative action. In such non-ideal
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conditions indirect means of reaching understanding through communication are needed.
As an integral part of a conception of communicative democracy, rhetoric can serve as
these means.
Rhetoric serves to direct one’s speech towards its intended audience. In a pluralistic
situation of structural group difference, rhetoric serves to translate across this group
difference: rhetoric constructs the speaker, audience and occasion and makes it possible
to communicate messages in a particular context and to a particular audience (Young
2000, 69). Rhetoric thus points to the connection between speaker and listener (Nichols
1987, 664) and also helps to build and sustain this connection as speakers are forced to
attend to the effect they have on their audience, and the audience can judge how well their
specific perspectives, values and backgrounds are taken into account by those speaking.
Rhetoric thus could be understood to include the various communicative means by which
participants in a political process attend to each other in their full specifity and difference.
In a context of adversarial politics, it is this attention-giving that helps keep political
conflict political (Bickford 1996, 41).
Rhetoric also comprises the myriad ways of colouring one’s speech, to the ways
something can be said, compared with what is said. As noted, in political deliberation a
dispassionate emotional tone and phrasing one’s speech with argumentative language
tend to be privileged over other ways of political communication, leading to de facto
exclusion of other styles of speech, and formation of differends. It should be noted that a
superficial lack of emotional tone is still an emotional tone among others (Young 2000,
67).
A focus on the use of rhetoric brings to view hidden exclusionary tendencies in norms of
public speaking that privilege certain styles of speaking and other modes of expression:
often people are not listened to merely because their accent of their speech or its idiom or
grammatical structure does not conform to a ‘proper’ manner of speaking (Young 2000,
70). As different social groups are also often used to different styles of speaking,
privileging a dispassionate and grammatically ‘proper’ style of speaking over more
emotional ways of speech serves to silence members of some social groups and to enable
others.
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Rhetoric also helps communication simply by colouring speech and making it interesting
(Young 1996, 130) and by creating a relationship between the speaker and listeners,
engendering willingness to understand the other (Young 2000, 68). Inclusive
communication requires attending to different styles of expression and idiom for those in
different social positions to be able to make themselves heard (Young 2000, 120). This is
a key component of creating conditions for a communicative democracy that works to
dispel differends.
Reducing all political communication to mere acts of argumentation and reason-giving is
a threat to functional deliberation. Engaging in deliberation is not only about attempts at
persuasion through the force of the superior argument: it is also expressive and
investigative, about presenting the multitude of perspectives within any polity, and
attending to this difference as fully as possible.
Narrative. When a group suffers from a wrong, an injustice in a situation of political
exclusion, they lack the idiom to express their suffering, to relate their experience in the
context of politics as a claim for justice.  They can, however, tell stories that express a
wrong. Such stories, related publicly inside and between groups, are important to phrasing
these sufferings into politically salient claims for rectifying them. Discursive reflection
on them might be able to develop a normative language for expressing their suffering as
an injustice that can be then presented as a claim for justice (Young 2000, 72). This would
make it possible to bring differends into language and finding an idiom for their
expression.
Political philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah has noted that narratives play a key role
in democratic, emancipatory politics: they are an important way for marginalized groups
to create and maintain a self-identity that can then be represented and told to others.
Without this telling and retelling of narratives that form identities, it would be impossible
to create the sort of positive images of the self that make group democratic action possible
for those excluded from mainstream political discourse. (Appiah 1994, 158–160.)
Taking a cue from Appiah, Young notes that telling of narratives reveals particular
experiences that those situated differently in society cannot share, but must come to
understand for justice to be done. Differends form when experiences of some can’t be
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expressed in the current idioms of speech. Storytelling is the bridge from exclusion and
silence to being heard and listened to. (Young 2000, 72.)
The function of storytelling is, then, to respond to existing differends. By telling stories,
social groups can bring to public discourse the situated knowledge they have of the social
position they are in, and articulate their own relation to this position. Though storytelling
sounds like an unlikely candidate for a mode of communication aimed towards bringing
about political change, it is often the primary way for a suffering group to make their
case. For us to understand claims coming from social positions different from our own,
we must understand the reasons that these claims are based on. These reasons are given
through telling stories, that is, explaining knowledge of the situation a group finds
themselves in and relating their experiences of suffering and wrong in that situation.
Young gives the example of wheelchair-using people, who make their request for
resources to remove impediments to their access to public spaces through relating their
stories of the obstacles that keep them from participating in society, both physical and
emotional (Young 2000, 74).
When we move away from a consensus-oriented view of politics towards an adversarial
understanding of politics, the problem of understanding becomes crucial: if shared
understandings about the issues on debate simply do not exist, how is deliberative politics
possible? In a polity divided by structural difference, the telling of narratives becomes of
utmost importance. Without listening to the stories of differently situated people, it is
impossible to understand why some things that matter much to some, while others might
believe them to be trivial, if not downright offensive. Narratives are the key to creating
the shared understandings that are needed for fruitful deliberation of shared issues.
Storytelling is thus an integral mode of communication for creating conditions for the
sharing and public dissemination of situated knowledge about the social conditions
(Young 2000, 76). As such, storytelling facilitates understanding across group difference
without making that difference irrelevant or attempting to dissolve it. It makes it possible
for us to realize that there really are other perspectives to a shared reality that exist apart
from our own, and helps situate our own perspective in relation to these others. As Young
puts it:
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Listening to those differently situated from myself and my close associates teaches me the
how my situation looks to them, in what relation they think I stand to them. Such a
contextualizing of perspective is especially important for groups that have power,
authority, or privilege. (Young 2000, 116.)
Lyotard also notes that allowing others to tell their stories is also allowing them to be told
by them. When we are telling narratives we move away from a focus on ourselves and
focus on the other, the addressee, relinquishing an autonomy of power and acknowledging
the other (JG, 36). Instead of stark contrasts and borders we enter a space where
negotiations become possible, where we are open to the presence of the other and willing
to accommodate them (JG, 37).
Young recognises that for reasoned discussion and disagreement about shared issues to
be at all possible, those engaged in debate must share an idiom for expressing alternative
proposals, rules of evidence and prediction, and normative principles to serve as
premisses for arguments about what ought to be done (Young 2000, 72). The role of a
narrative mode of political communication is also to reach towards understanding about
these conditions for reasoned debate in a way that does not take the received
understandings always underlying deliberation in non-ideal condition as constitutive, as
they always carry the possibility of the existence of differends.
This seems reminiscent of Richard Rorty’s position on the Lyotard-Habermas debate of
the 1980’s, in which Lyotard’s overreaching critique of the possibility of lasting and
overreaching political consensus10 and Habermas’ insistence on the possibility of a
dialogical continuation of the project of the Enlightenment11 clashed. Rorty tries to split
the difference between the two: he elects to replace Habermas’ ideas on ideal consensus
and the ‘generalized other’ with historical narratives, especially of the genealogical sort
given by Michel Foucault. I quote at length:
Detailed historical narratives of the sort Foucault offers us would take the place of
philosophical metanarratives. Such narratives would not unmask something created by
power called ‘ideology’ in the name of something not created by power called ‘validity’ or
‘emancipation.’ They would just explain who was currently getting and using power for
10 See PC, especially xxiv and 60 ff.
11 See Habermas 1982 and 1997.
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what purposes, and then (unlike Foucault) suggest how some other people might get it and
use it for other purposes. (Rorty 1984, 41–42.)
Rorty is both willing to say that politics is about seeking consensus through
communication, and that this communication needs to be more sensitive to the political
realities of the communities it happens in. Narrative as a mode of communication fills an
important practical function of increasing our knowledge about the structures and
relations of power underlying politics, and gives political actors the hitherto lacking
knowledge and vocabulary they need to change the prevailing balance of power towards
a more equitable one. It is the preferred method of bearing witness to differends.
Of the three additional modes of communication presented by Iris Marion Young,
narrative is perhaps the most important and theoretically controversial. The thought of
narratives as a mode of communication especially fruitful to witnessing the existence of
differends (Young 2000, 72 ff.) and the idea of building narratives as a mode of
communication into a part of a framework of deliberative politics, is actually of much
larger theoretical significance than Young would let on. By doing this she seems to be
taking part in a debate that was thought to be, in a way, settled, or at least dormant for the
time being. Young could be seen as subtly aiming to find some middle ground between
Lyotard and Habermas.
Communicative democracy, with its readiness to embrace even radical difference, seems
to be walking the tightrope between the two. On one hand, communicative democracy is
a positive exercise in formulating a pragmatic conception of democracy that responds to
the actual need for building a lasting, functional political framework for working through
differences in a just manner, without succumbing to the antagonism that
incommensurability between participants would entail. Lyotard’s own postmodernism
that simply denies the validity of the ‘metanarratives’ of, for example, justice, political
consensus and Enlightenment (PC, 60), arguably succumbs to the ultimate negativity of
the project of the differend in general. (Williams 1998, 117.) On the other hand, the
conception of communicative democracy distances itself from the overtly universalizing
tendencies of the many conceptions of deliberative democracy that seem either willingly
compatible with, or explicitly aiming towards a universalist, consensus-oriented
communicative ethics as in the work of Jürgen Habermas (e.g. Habermas 1996, 25 ff.).
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As we have seen, we have good reason to be unhappy with the totalizing and exclusionary
implications that result from a desire for a rationally motivated consensus, a normative
concept important to the standard model of deliberative democracy and Habermas’
project of finding a normative basis for communicative ethics. At the same time we should
not be willing to give up the theoretical potential for social criticism offered by a critical
theory of democracy, grounded to a firm, normative commitment to justice. The solution
put forward here is to try to find a way of bringing difference into the deliberative process
in a way that does not collapse the whole edifice of deliberation into overt antagonism,
fights over ‘recognition’, or conservative posturing over the impossibility of reaching
understanding with those cast into the lot of the Other.
The basic requirement for emancipatory social criticism, finding a normative ideal against
which to judge the social situation here and now, could be seen as just another move that
seeks to gain control over other narratives and genres of discourse, the cynical creation
of another differend. By proposing a conception of a communicative demoracy I have,
after Young and others, aimed to show that this negative view is flawed: social criticism
is possible, and that the concept of the differend is quite useful in the context of social
criticism. As long as there remains the possibility of establishing a common referent, the
communicative mode of narrative or storytelling does not separate us from each other
into different, mutually hostile tribes, but helps us increase the amount of social
knowledge we have of a shared reality, a shared referent, with its relevant structures and
social positions. It is this possibility of ‘listening over difference’ (Young 1997b, 403)
that brings to mind Lyotard’s description of justice as the game of listening (JG, 71–72.):
differently situated people must be willing to listen to stories told from perspectives
different from their own, gaining what Hannah Arendt would call ‘enlarged mentality’
about the unjust structures of the shared polity and the silent suffering caused by them.
Differends can be solved, if we are willing attend to the specifity of the different social
positions the participants to communication come from, and use this to, through
deliberation, formulate objective account of the societal structures  that underlie the
deliberative attempt. The particular perspectives of the participants, expressed, paint a
picture of society not as unified, but separated into groups that exist in relations of
privilege and disadvantage to each other. To be relevant, then, a theory of communicative
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democracy must come paired with a politically salient theory of social groups as based
on an understanding of objective social structures, not identity, cultural or otherwise.
3.5 Communicative Democracy or Transformative Dialogue?
To end this chapter, I would like to shortly take up a recent criticism and a further
development of Iris Marion Young’s account of communicative democracy, made by
Paul Healy. As Healy explicitly focuses on rethinking the role that social perspectives
play in the version of communicative democracy I have presented above, it seems prudent
to explore his argument briefly to see if there is something to be gained from addressing
it.
According to Healy, despite giving specific attention to situated perspectives, group
difference and a plurality of acceptable modes of communication, communicative
democracy does not go far enough in breaking the mould of consensus-oriented ideal
deliberation. What is needed is a ‘dialogical reappropriation of the deliberative model’
that goes beyond Young in all these respects. (Healy 2011b, 298.) Healy calls his
conception ‘transformative dialogue’ to further differentiate it from preceding
conceptions of deliberative democracy.
Healy criticises Young’s insistence on favouring asymmetrical reciprocity of the situated
perspectives that participants bring to deliberation. While insisting on their symmetry, or
the possibility of complete identification across difference would, as noted above in
chapter 3.3, merely result in a return to a consensus-oriented model of deliberative
democracy with its ‘homogenizing presuppositions’ (Healy 2011b, 297), Young’s model
might entail too high a criteria for reaching understanding over difference. This is because
of Young’s insistence on the asymmetry between perspectives, or a notion of difference
that transcends communication and makes it impossible to ‘trade places’ with persons
form other social positions. Everyone brings to communicative interaction a distinctive
history of experiences, habits and emotions that make reversing positions, truly seeing
the world from another’s perspective, impossible.  (Young 1997a, 347). While Young
insists that this is a necessary feature of a communicative democracy that can have a truly
creative encounter with difference without painting over it with our own presuppositions
and stereotypes that spring from our own social positioning (Young 1997a, 347 ff.), it
runs the risk of making understanding over difference impossible altogether.
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Healy makes use of Lorenzo Simpson’s critique of Iris Young’s conception of
communicative democracy. Simpson (2001, 101) criticizes Young’s focus on different
modes of communication, especially narratives, claiming that they do not add anything
substantially new to deliberative theory. Calling her model of communicative democracy
an account of communicative understanding from ‘a postmodern perspective’ (Simpson
2001, 102), Simpson suggests that Young’s insistence on amending the consensus-
oriented deliberative model with different modes of communication fails as a critique of
deliberative democracy, as she merely succeeds in highlighting some features of
deliberative democracy that other deliberative theorists ‘would happily endorse if asked
to’. A focus on greetings, rhetoric and narratives merely supplies the needed material that
takes us into ‘the threshold of communication, to the antechamber of dialogue’. (Simpson
2001, 101.)
While lauding Young for her willingness to do justice for difference in deliberative
theory, Simpson especially criticizes her for the aforementioned insistence on
asymmetrical reciprocity between perspectives. According to Simpson, Young’s one-
sided emphasis on irreversibility of perspectives and ‘listening over difference’ actually
subverts the notion of understanding by conflating ‘reversibility of perspectives’ with
‘mutual identification’ (Simpson 2000, 434–435). This makes understanding over
difference impossible, as ‘Young, therefore, illegitimately conflates the quite reasonable
claim that “I cannot know what it feels like to be you” with the claim that “I cannot
understand you.”’ (Simpson 2001, 105.)  This makes difference insurmountable: what is
needed is a return to the desire for a symmetrical relation and reversibility of perspectives
as something that enables an awareness of difference instead of denying it (Simpson 2001,
103). We should aim towards learning and understanding from other cultures in a
symmetrical, hermeneutical dialogue that may transform difference itself, resulting in a
Gadamerian ‘fusion of horizons’ (Simpson 2001, 79 ff.).
This process should be understood as the forging of ‘situated metalanguages’ that
facilitate reaching understanding and common recognition between the parties by creating
common ground where there before was none. This is done by redescribing all the parties
taking part in the negotiation of this new language, while mediating the differences each
would like recognized. (Simpson 2001, 81.) Simpson likens this project to the creation of
a new dialect that is acceptable and understandable to both parties (Simpson 2001, 89),
80
like using a shared third language as a bridge between people who otherwise find each
other unintelligible (Simpson 2001, 84). This language would reveal commonalities
between parties, while respectfully underlining, not usurping, the difference between
them, making it possible for the encounter to add to the vocabulary of both parties in a
moment of edification. This new vocabulary can then add to the possibilities of self-
description of both parties, leading to the possibility of a transformative, edifying
encounter with difference, as parties might come to be altered in the ways they understand
themselves (Simpson 2001, 89).
Healy wants to retain Simpson’s willingness to replace the notion of deliberation with
that of a hermeneutical dialogue, while insisting that Simpson has read Young wrong. As
Young states clearly and often (e.g. Young 1996, 127), she aims explicitly to create a
conception of deliberative communication that enables true transformation in the
preferences and opinions of the participants: the insistence on communication between
irreversible perspectives does not mean that that difference is ‘total otherness’, but that
communication is meaningful as a process of learning ‘precisely because perspectives are
beyond one another and not reducible to a common good’ (Young 1996, 127). Healy,
however claims that despite Young sharing the same ambition as Simpson, she fails in
thinking that a mere focus on asymmetrical reciprocity would be enough (Healy 2011a,
166).
Healy wishes to set aside the question of symmetrical/asymmetrical reciprocity, and pose
the question in the light of ‘dialogical reciprocity’ (Healy 2011b, 301), in which a
hermeneutical process ties the two together as necessary components of a transformative,
dialogical encounter with difference. This means doing away altogether with discursive
deliberation as the template of political interaction, and replacing it with the concept of
transformative dialogue (Healy 2011b, 306). This means that instead of seeking
symmetrical or asymmetrical reciprocity as set out above, we should desire to seek
‘dialogical equality’ as the ground on which a serious, hermeneutic, back-and-forth
encounter with difference could take place on (Healy 2011a, 164).  Healy accords with
Young’s contention that deliberation focused on argument is a too rigid, formal and
culturally specific means of communication, but instead of amending the deliberative
model, he calls for a ‘thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the structure, dynamics and
the logic of dialectical interaction at issue in terms conducive to facilitating the
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development of enlarged understanding through potentially transformative learning’.
(Healy 2011b, 307.)
This would mean replacing the conception of communicative democracy with a
‘“structured conversation” with transformative potential’ and the notion of a group of
rational decision-makers with a democratic discourse that can ‘better meet the needs of
an increasingly pluralistic and multicultural world’ while ‘doing justice to its multifaceted
complexity’ better than the deliberative template (Healy 2011b, 309).
Healy’s desire to overthrow the template of deliberative interaction stems from a need to
rid the conception of a public sphere completely from the residue of any Habermasian
orientation towards consensus, replacing with a ‘cosmopolitan public sphere’ truly open
to difference (Healy 2011a, 165). This requires replacing the notion of deliberation-as-
argumentation completely with a dialogical interaction that is open to different modes of
communication and facilitates true learning from difference; Healy sees Young as setting
out the direction that the notion of transformative dialogue follows in completely
overhauling the notion of deliberation. However, argumentation as a mode of
communication cannot be gotten rid of so easily: Healy himself, in the end, admits that
he is forced to give a place to argumentative ground rules of dialogue, ‘designed as they
are to ensure that contending positions are evaluated on their merits rather than endorsed
on merely arbitrary or strategic grounds’ (Healy 2011a, 175). He still defends his view
by its hermeneutical focus on learning:
But if argumentation thus cannot be dispensed with, given its inherently if inadvertently,
monological character on the Habermasian template, the operative conception nonetheless
stands in need of dialogical reappropriation so as to render it more genuinely responsive to
difference and correspondingly conducive to mutual learning. (Healy 2011a, 175–176.)
What, if anything, should we take home from this encounter? While cogently describing
many of the pitfalls of deliberative theory, Healy’s (and Simpson’s) focus on mutual
edification and transformation through dialogue is far too ready to subsume all political
conflict under the rubric of disputes over cultural meanings and understandings. As I
wrote above in chapter 3.2.1, this is precisely what the conception of communicative
democracy given in this thesis was meant to address: nowhere in Healy’s essays is to be
found the attention to the manifold concrete political issues caused by structural
inequalities. Both Healy and Simpson narrowly focus on situated perspectives and the
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possibility of understanding between and over them, while the underlying reasons for the
existence of those perspectives are left outside the discussion.
Healy’s and Simpson’s hermeneutical approach to revising discursive deliberation, with
its focus on reaching understanding over perspectives through dialogue, may give
conceptual tools to take the project of communicative democracy further, and I believe
the idea merits further research. Simpson’s idea of ‘situated metalanguages’ quite
obviously resonates with the need presented by Lyotard for formulating new idioms and
genres of discourse, for finding new ways to link to ‘reality that is never given, but always
situated by particular narratives’ (Bennington 1988, 112). As a theoretical approach on
bearing witness to differends, a ‘transformative dialogue’ might well be a direction that
deliberative theory might be expanded upon.
However, the hermeneutical approach seems somewhat ill-equipped to match the critical
normative potential offered by a differend-sensitive conception of communicative
democracy as formulated above. What is at the core of arguments for communicative
democracy is its imperative for doing justice.
Knowledge that I am in a situation of collective problem solving with others who have
different perspectives on the problems and different cultures and values from my own, and
that they have the right to challenge my claims and arguments, forces me to transform my
expressions of self-interest and desire into appeals to justice. Proposals for collective
policies need not be expressed as general interest, an interest all can share; they may be
claims about an obligation on the part of the public to recognize and provide for some
unique needs of uniquely situated persons. Nevertheless the plural public perspectives
require such expressed claims to appeal across difference, to presume a lack of
understanding to be bridged, thus transforming the experience itself. (Young 1996, 128.)
Communicative democracy is about taking up and dealing with structural injustice as a
concrete phenomenon, affecting concrete persons, living in an unremittingly concrete and
unjust world. Simpson and Healy, focusing on understanding over cultural issues, seem
to work at a level of abstraction that forgets that politics is marred by its happening in a
non-ideal world, a world rife with structural inequalities of power that reflect on political
decision-making processes themselves. I see no potential for Healy’s ‘transformative
dialogue’ overcoming the sheer practical force for improving the business of day-to-day
decision making or politics that a sufficiently difference- and differend-sensitive
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conception of communicative democracy as an amendment to deliberative democracy
offers.
84
4. The Limits of Deliberation
In the chapters above I have set out a way of using Jean-François Lyotard’s concept of
the differend as a key normative concept for evaluating existing conceptions of
deliberative democracy. In the ‘role of the critic or of conscience in a speculative politics’
(Williams 1998, 117) the differend is a useful concept for revealing blind spots in
deliberative theory, showing how insisting on focusing on the common good, the
possibility of reaching an ideal consensus and the possibility of reversal of perspectives,
though well-meaning, unwillingly perpetuates unjust social structures by occluding them
from view and making addressing them often implausible, if not impossible.
Largely based on the conception of communicative democracy as formulated by Iris
Marion Young, I have suggested above an alternative to the ‘standard model’ that takes,
to a large extent, the insights thus gained into account and presents possible solutions to
these problems. I’ve supported this conception with insights gained from other theorists
who have grappled with the problems that encounters with difference present to
democratic theory. As it stands, I maintain that this communicative amendment of
deliberative democracy shows promise as a form of democratic theory that can bring real
change into the way we understand democratic politics, as it takes place in a non-ideal
world beset by structural inequality and injustice, and divided by differences in class,
gender, sexuality, culture, religion and lifestyles.
One of the aims of this thesis has been to show that it is possible to build a model of
group-differentiated politics that is immune to most of the criticism levied by theorists
like Seyla Benhabib (e.g. Benhabib 1996) and Jürgen Habermas (e.g. 1999b) against
‘politics of difference’ or ‘politics of recognition’. I argue that even with the problems
associated with group-differentiated politics, it is important to find politically salient ways
to speak about social groups. This is simply because consensus-oriented models of
deliberative democracy, despite their intention to make plurality the basis of the realm of
politics, still seem unable to grasp the concrete importance of inclusion of group
difference and different situated perspectives as a key condition for politics that aim
towards effecting justice.
I’ve tried to show that the way forward should be moving away from an understanding of
deliberative democracy as the business of taking care of common shared problems and
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addressing generalized claims, the aim being a societal consensus. Democracy should be
about a communicative struggle for justice, the witnessing and resolution of differends
and the building of a more inclusive and just polity through better acknowledging the
societal structural frameworks that the day to day conducting of politics happens in.
However, can any theoretical conception of deliberative democracy, however sensitive to
differends, really be used to practical effect in campaigning for justice and actually
effecting concrete social change? To end this thesis, I would like to discuss one particular
article by Iris Marion Young, ‘Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy’ (2001).
Young sets two ideal types against each other: the deliberative democrat and the activist.
The deliberative democrat believes that the most legitimate and just way to conduct
politics is through public deliberation, in which parties to disagreement ‘criticize one
another’s proposals and reasons and are open to being criticized by others’ (Young 2001,
672). Instead of antagonism and confrontation by direct action, the ‘politically engaged
citizen’ should seek to create sites of deliberation in which disagreeing parties could come
together to debate about the consequences of decisions made and present reasonable
claims of justice (Young 2001, 672).
The activist responds that engaging in deliberation in conditions of serious structural
inequality is futile. Even if we assume the most inclusive and differend-sensitive
conception of communicative democracy possible, one that seriously takes into account
structural differences and inequalities in power between the participants, the deliberation
can, in non-ideal conditions, only decide between alternatives dictated by the structural
arrangements the deliberation itself takes place in. (Young 2001, 678-685.) Instead of
lending legitimacy to unjust political arrangements, one should avoid being co-opted by
them and criticise them from the outside, even disrupting deliberative processes (by non-
violent means), if it necessary to get one’s voice heard (Young 2001, 673).
Young claims that deliberative theorists rarely address political activism as a form of
effecting social change, despite the fact that many rights in democratic societies (‘the
eight-hour day, votes for women, the right to sit at any lunch counter’, for example) have
not been won through deliberation, but by direct action taken by social justice movements
(Young 2001, 670).  Political activism has its own democratic virtues as a means of
presenting demands for justice when engaging deliberation would have little to no effect,
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or, in the worst case, would even legitimize unjust structural arrangements by making
them appear acceptable to all participants that take part in the deliberation.
It is undeniable that movements for social justice have succeeded in actually focusing
public discussion on existing injustices when deliberative practices would have had little
success. A good recent example has been the public discussion over the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) free trade negotiations between the United
States and the European Union, which have been mostly conducted in secrecy. The issue
of making the negotiations more open and making the contents of the negotiations public,
not to mention revealing the well-funded lobbying apparatuses working around the
negotiations, arose to public consciousness through the decidedly undeliberative means
of direct activism, as critics of the free trade agreement spread information about the
negotiations and the draft proposal in the internet and organized mass protests in the
streets of large cities across Europe.
The problem is that the ideal deliberative democrat should actually be critical of such
movements. Even if the activist was invited to present their claims and deliberate on them
with their opponents in a deliberative forum, they would refuse. The activist, believing
the result of such deliberations with the already powerful to be a foregone conclusion,
decides not to engage in reasonable and well-mannered deliberation with their opponents.
Instead they choose to openly and actively confront and demand justice from those they
disagree with, preferring the exposure their cause gains in the public eye to the futile
argumentation against the already powerful. (Young 2001, 680).
It would seem that no matter how inclusive and sensitive to differends a deliberative body
might be, in real life, under unjust conditions, the demands of the structural and
ideological frameworks that deliberative politics take place in have a large influence on
setting the agenda of deliberation and delineating the alternative policy proposals
deliberated upon. As Young puts it:
If the deliberative democrat tries to insert practices of deliberation into existing public
policy discussions, she is forced to accept the range of alternatives that existing structural
constraints allow. […] To the extent that such implementation must presuppose constrained
alternatives that cannot question existing institutional priorities and social structures,
deliberation is as likely to reinforce injustice as to undermine it. (Young 2001, 684.)
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What is important to note is that, as discusses above the very genre of discourse, the
language deliberation takes place in, are influenced by the complex structural inequalities
inherent in society. No deliberative setting can hope to be completely aware of the myriad
distortions that society forces on it; Young calls this in Gramscian terms the problem of
‘hegemonic discourse’ (Young 2001, 685). As these distortions occlude structural
inequalities on power, differends are formed.
Young ends up warning theorists of deliberative democracy, who want to put their ideas
to practice, from being co-opted by the structures they hope to change. The role of
deliberative democracy should, according to her, be a critical one, ‘which exposes the
exclusions and constraints in supposed fair processes of decision making, which make
the legitimacy of their conclusions suspect’ (Young 2001, 688). To do this, deliberative
theorists should aim to create settings that examine and criticise the structural conditions
that politics place in, while staying away from the day to day business of setting official
policy (Young 2001, 684).
The conception of communicative democracy gives a functional set of normative criteria
for polities to reflect on their own justness, and conceptual tools for finding ways of
giving voice to those previously excluded from deliberation, bearing witness to differends
within them. Still, it must be admitted that sometimes the intervention for justice must
come from without, from the political activists who are willing to disrupt the status quo,
to present alternatives and to take direct action to promote justice in non-ideal conditions.
Young suggests that the very notion of deliberative discourse must be transformed to
include the myriad of ‘decentered’ and ‘disorderly’ ways of presenting appeals to justice
in the public eye, be they street parades and sit-ins, songs and books; the functional norm
of democratic communication thus changes from giving reasons and listening to others
into ‘the broad understanding of generation and influence of public opinion’ (Young
2001, 688).
What originally motivated me to research the theory of deliberative democracy, leading
up to this thesis, and what sets Young apart from many other theorists of deliberative
democracy, is her commitment to democracy—despite its flaws and the hardships of
taking part in its daily conduct—as the form of government that best promotes justice
(Young 2000, 27). The openness to appeals to justice from those differently situated from
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us is the cornerstone of communicative democracy, and also the factor that makes it
uniquely suited to answering to ‘the voice of conscience’ that is the concept of the
differend.
What has presented difficulties to me during the writing of this thesis is the movement
between the ideal and the concrete, the articulation of descriptions of utopia that are
forced to collide with the daily reality of injustice suffered daily due to concrete structural
relations of privilege and disadvantage. I have wished to preserve both the critical
normative potential of the concept of deliberative democracy as ideal procedure, while
pushing for the possibility for inclusion of even radical difference within the limits of this
ideal. As theorists of deliberative democracy rightly assert, democracy needs to be
founded on universally valid norms. At the same time even radical difference must be
given its due for democracy to be truly inclusive.
I have wished to retain the commitment of critical theory to creating normative tools that
help us effect concrete social change. I believe that the account of communicative
democracy given in this thesis is a step towards such. As Seyla Benhabib claims, a utopian
perspective is something that a functional democracy as something to work towards, as
‘a certain anticipatory utopia, a projection of the future as it could be, becomes necessary.’
(Benhabib 1985, 96)
What remains is to admit that communicative democracy, even at its most inclusive,
might not be the final answer. The philosophical lesson to be gained from Lyotard’s work
on the differend is that every philosophically consistent theory of politics is flawed, there
is always room for betterment. The work of doing justice, answering to differends, asking
‘Is it happening?’ remains always unfinished.
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